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The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the
United States
by Richard S. Kay*
I. INTRODUCTION
T his essay examines the process by which constitutional change came
to Canada in 1980-82 and the relevant criteria of law and politics
against which that process and its results may be judged. The same kinds
of questions may be asked about the creation of the basic constitutional
rules in any legal system, but rarely have these issues been exposed with
such force and clarity as in the recent events in Canada. To illustrate the
universality of these questions, and further to illuminate the factors
which bear upon them, a parallel inquiry will be made into the events
leading to the institution of the Constitution of the United States in
1787-89. In each case, it will be critical to distinguish two kinds of evalua-
tions, one based on conformity of the constituent process with existing
positive law-legality; the second based on its social and political
acceptability-legitimacy.
II. THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION, 1982
In the fall of 1981, Canada's protracted constitutional debate reached
a climax in an agreement among the governments of nine provinces and
the federal government concerning the contents of a package of amend-
ments to the British North America Acts.' These amendments contained
two principal features. They entrenched in the Constitution of Canada a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms limiting the powers of both the federal
Parliament and the provincial legislatures to impinge on certain protected
liberties.2 They also established a set of procedures for the further
amendment of the Constitution. These procedures required (depending
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut, School of Law; M.A., Yale University
(1974); J.D., Harvard University (1973); A.B., Brandeis University (1968).
I am grateful for the support of the Canada-United States Law Institute which enabled
me to undertake this work. Additional assistance was provided by the University of Con-
necticut Research Foundation. Several people have been kind enough to read earlier ver-
sions of this paper. I would particularly like to acknowledge the assistance of Peter Hogg,
Kent Newmyer, John Noyes, Stephen Scott, Aviam Soifer and Carol Weisbrod. I am in-
debted to Lucy Potter for valuable research assistance. These people, of course, should be
absolved from any errors or misconceptions that remain.
1 S. DUNN, THE YEAR IN REvIEw 1981: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 30
(1982).
2 Constitution Act, 1982 §§ 1-34.
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on the subject matter of the amendment proposed) the approval of some
combination of federal and provincial legislative bodies.' For a significant
category of constitutional amendments, these new arrangements replaced
the awkward and embarrassing practice of effecting constitutional
changes by securing the enactment of a statute in the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. Now, as a matter of law, all Canadian constitutional
change may be accomplished by Canadian political institutions. The
package of amendments thus achieved what had been desired and dis-
cussed for fifty years, the "patriation" of the Canadian Constitution.
As a formal matter these changes were brought into effect by a proc-
lamation of the Queen on April 17, 1982." The Queen's authority so to
proclaim was granted by the Constitution Act, 1982. That Act, in turn,
was given the force of law in Canada by the Canada Act which was passed
by the British Parliament on March 29, 1982.5 That British statute was a
response to a joint address to the Queen from the houses of the Canadian
Parliament which was approved by resolutions passed by the Canadian
Senate and House of Commons in December 1981.6 However, it is broadly
acknowledged that all of these actions were little more than the execution
of the substantive decisions agreed to by the ten heads of government the
previous November.' Since the political process that produced that agree-
3 Constitution Act, 1982 §§ 38-49. The Act imposes different amending procedures for
different sections: The "general" amending procedure is defined in § 38(1). Under § 38(1),
amendments relating to federal parliamentary authority, the principle of proportionate rep-
resentation and certain other matters (specified in § 42(1)) can be effected by resolutions of
both houses of the Federal Parliament and resolutions of the legislative assemblies of two-
thirds of the provinces. Section 38(2) provides that if amendments derogate from provincial
legislative powers, they must have the approval of a majority of the memberships of the
legislative bodies specified in § 38(1). Moreover, any provincial legislative assembly may, by
resolution approved by a majority, exclude that province from an amendments effect. Sec-
tion 41 requires unanimous approval by the legislative assemblies of the provinces and the
federal Senate and the House of Commons for amendments relating to the offices of Queen,
Governor-General and provincial Lieutenant-Governors, certain minimal provincial repre-
sentation in the Federal Parliament, the use of the English or French language, the compo-
sition of the Supreme Court of Canada and the amending formulas themselves. Under § 43,
amendments concerning, inter alia, provincial boundaries and intra-provincial language
matters must be approved by the houses of the Federal Parliament and the legislative as-
semblies of the provinces involved. Amendments not otherwise covered, 0ealing with the
governmental machinery of either Canada or a province, may be effected, under §§ 44 and
41, by the approval of the relevant legislature alone. See generally Cheffins, The Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 and Amending Formula: Political and Legal Implications, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV.
43 (1982); Scott, Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional Amendment
Process, 20 W. ONT. L. REv. 24 (1982).
4 Can. Gaz. (Part I), vol. 116, No. 17, at 2927-28.
' Canada Act, 1982.
' The Resolutions were adopted on Dec. 2, 1981 in the House of Commons, VOTES AND
PROCEEDINGS No. 268, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess. 4304, 4308 (1981), on Dec. 8, 1981 in the Senate,
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE No. 162, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess. 1722, 1759 (1981).
Following the November 10, 1981 agreement, the nine consenting provincial premiers
and the federal government assented to certain changes in the Charter of Rights and Free-
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ment has been the subject of extensive commentary,8 a brief outline of
the salient events should suffice.
Since the confederation of the British colonies in North America in
1867, governments in Canada have operated under legal limitations im-
posed by a British statute of that year, the British North America Act
(BNA Act).9 Because the BNA Act provided no general mechanism for
amendment by Canadian authorities, changes in those legal limits ordina-
rily had to be effected by further British legislation (usually amendments
to the BNA Act) enacted in response to requests from Canada. ° As Cana-
dian political independence from the United Kingdom came to be in-
creasingly recognized in the twentieth century, the unseemliness of this
procedure became more evident. A series of federal provincial conferences
were convened to seek agreement on a domestic amending procedure"'
but all failed.
In the wake of the unsuccessful referendum in Quebec on "sover-
eignty-association" in May 1980,12 another such conference met in Octo-
ber 1980. After the October 1980 conference also failed to agree on consti-
tutional reform, the federal government announced its intention to
request from the United Kingdom Parliament the enactment of a consti-
tutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a domestic constitutional
amending procedure. This request would issue whether or not the provin-
doms strengthening the protections of native groups, banning official discriminations based
on gender and altering the circumstances in which a province opting out of a constitutional
amendment was entitled to financial compensation. The accord, so modified, was faithfully
followed by the enacting authorities. S. DUNN, supra note 1, at 31. The only other serious
question raised was the opposition of the government of Quebec. See infra notes 208-17 and
accompanying text. Apart from the change in compensation mentioned, this did not result
in any changes in the November agreement.
2 See, e.g., AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT
28 (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds. 1983); S. DUNN, supra note 1; R. ZUKOWSKY, STRUGGLE
OVER THE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE QUEBEC REFERENDUM TO THE SUPREME COURT, 2 INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CANADA: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 1980 (1981); Cairns, The Politics
of Constitution-Making: The Canadian Experience, in REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLIT-
ICS oF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds.) (forthcoming Macmillian);
Kerr, Constitution Act, 1980: Is it Constitutional?, 30 U.N.B. L.J. 73 (1981); Knopff, Legal
Theory and the "Patriation" Debate, 7 QUEENS L.J. 41 (1981); McConnell, Cutting the Gor-
dian Knot: The Amending Process in Canada, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1981);
Schwartz, General National Agreement: The Legal Sanction for Constitutional Reform in
Canada, 6 QUEENS L.J. 513a (1981); Slattery, The Independence of Canada, 5 Sup. CT. L.
REV. 369 (1983); Strayer, The Patriation and Legitimacy of the Canadian Constitution, 45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1982).
9 Constitution Act, 1867.
10 See Constitutional Amendment References, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753; 11 Man. R.2d 1, 34
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, 95 Atl. Prov. 1; [1981] 6 W.W.R. 1, 125 D.L.R.3d 1, 39 N.R. 1, 209-10
(1981); [hereinafter cited as 39 N.R. 1].
" Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, Constitutional Amendment References,
39 N.R. 1 (1981), at app. III.
2 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 29.
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cial governments concurred. 13 This decision-to seek "unilateral patria-
tion"-brought to the surface a long unresolved difference as to which
Canadian authorities should apply for constitutional amendments from
Westminster. For at least fifty years the federal authorities had not
sought an amendment derogating from the legislative powers of the prov-
inces without first obtaining the consent of the government of each prov-
ince affected.14 Now the federal government proposed to abandon that
policy which, while uniformly followed in practice, had never been fully
conceded in theory. The provincial response was fierce. Eight of the ten
provincial governments joined to oppose the federal initiative.1 5
The ensuing national debate on the propriety of the different ap-
proaches to constitutional change was both extensive and intensive.' 6 It
involved spokesmen for various groups and interests, parliamentary rhet-
oric and maneuvering, alliances and divisions among governments and
parties, academic scrutiny and journalistic commentary and a critical
judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada.17 The result was the Federal-
Provincial Conference of November 1981 at which a compromise was
struck to which only the government of Quebec objected. The Charter of
Rights and Freedoms proposed by the federal government was weakened,
but approved. The alternative amending formula proposed by the prov-
inces was adopted with minor modifications. After further adjustments, to
which all ten contracting governments agreed, the constitutional plan for-
mally was put into place through the actions of the Canadian and United
Kingdom Parliaments and the proclamation of the Queen.'
This procedure put into place what amounts to a new constitutional
regime in Canada. To better understand what was at stake in that pro-
cess, the decisions being made will be re-examined and more abstract cri-
teria for evaluating them will be suggested.
III. LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY AT THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTION
Legal, like pre-legal, social rules have no common identity or basis of
existence in time save that of the group of human beings which accepts
them. In times of crisis, the lawyer is obliged to admit that his judgments
rest on a critical assessment of the identity of an object which normally
13 Id. at 58.
14 See G. FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 15-16 (1965). See
infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
"3 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 61-65.
16 The relevant events are chronicled in S. DUNN, supra note 1 and B. ZUKOWSKY, supra
note 8, at 61-65. See also infra notes 188-217 and accompanying text.
17 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. 1 (1981). Two majority and two dis-
senting opinions were handed down. The Court held 7-2 that the federal initiative was per-
missible in strict law. These opinions will be referred to as (Law Majority) and (Law Dis-
sent). The Court also held 6-3 that the initiative conflicted with a constitutional convention.
These opinions will be referred to as (Convention Majority) and (Convention Dissent).
" See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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he regards as "artificial and anomalous" and legally barely intelligi-
ble-viz, the great "unincorporated society" in which he lives.
J.M. Finnis, 197319
The most widely held interpretation of the political and legal events
in Canada in 1980-82 is that they accomplished not the creation of a new
Constitution, but merely the revision or completion of an existing one.
The majority of justices of the Supreme Court of Canada described the
enactment of a domestic amending procedure as "a finishing opera-
tion . . . fitting a piece into the constitutional edifice. '20 In one sense,
this is certainly accurate. The principal institutions of government re-
mained untouched, and the distribution of powers between provincial and
federal governments was largely unchanged.
Given the establishment of a new amending procedure, the constitu-
tional reforms of 1980-82 are properly understood as involving much
more. All law in Canada depends for its binding force on the authority of
the constitution. Prior to 1982, the legal justification for every instance of
law-making and law-application was ultimately derived from the powers
granted in the British North America Acts, and no instance of law-mak-
ing or law-application was valid which occurred in a manner not so au-
thorized. Moreover, no legal power existed in Canada to alter that alloca-
tion of permitted and forbidden actions.21 It could be altered only by a
statute of the United Kingdom, and the preconditions to requesting such
a statute were undefined in law. With the advent of the amending formu-
las of the Constitution Act, 1982, this situation changed. Those formulas
specify certain collections of Canadian organs of government (federal and
provincial legislative bodies and executive organs) which alone may alter
the conditions for valid law-making and law-application in Canada. These
constitutional amendment authorities are now, therefore, the masters of
the Canadian legal system to a degree which no Canadian agency could
attain before the Constitution Act came into force. The federal-provincial
distribution of powers, the ownership of resources, the personal and prop-
erty rights of individuals, the shape and composition of Parliament, the
existence of the provinces, the continuation of democratic government it-
self all lie-as matters of law-in the hands of the persons and institution
comprising the appropriate amending powers.2
" Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44,
70 (2d ser. 1973).
20 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 48 (Majority Law). See Cairns,
Politics of Constitutional Conservatism, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY
AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 28, 29 (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds. 1983) ("Our constitutional
system was only modified, not overthrown by our recent constitutional renewal").
1 Under §§ 91 and 92 the provincial legislatures and, in certain respects the federal
Parliament were empowered to amend their own constitutions. But this restricted amending
power was, itself, entrenched beyond Canadian legal reach.
" The Constitution Act, 1982 is exhaustive in enumerating those parts of the Canadian
1984]
116 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
The major question facing Canada in 1980-82 was, therefore, the
proper way to determine the ultimate governing rules of the legal system.
Such a decision was obviously a matter of profound importance for, in a
constitutional regime, political decisions are made by entities created and
controlled by law. Thus, the question was also one of the appropriate def-
inition of the ultimate political power.
By what standards should the alternative outcomes in such a decision
be judged? They cannot be evaluated by any measure of positive law-of
legality. This is true even though the subject is the character of the legal
system. Indeed, it is just because the question is one of defining the ulti-
mate power to modify, destroy and create anew the rules of law that
those rules, themselves, cannot provide a solution. 2 Rather the issue is, in
the most fundamental sense, one of political choice.
Every legal system sits upon a political bottom. A familiar illustra-
tion in the literature of constitutional theory traces, by a process of re-
gression, the sources of validity for, say, a city ordinance. The ordinance
is valid because enacted in the manner provided in the City Charter. The
Charter is valid because promulgated in accordance with the terms of a
legislative enabling act. The enabling act is valid because enacted by the
legislature in a way authorized by the Constitution. At this point, ordina-
rily, the chain of legality must stop. The Constitution is binding law, but
not because it was created under the authority of some higher instance of
positive law.24 The source of the legal quality of the Constitution-and
therefore, the source of the legal quality of all valid law-must be found
in some phenomenon other than law.
Many have attempted to characterize that phenomenon. Hans Kelsen
wrote of a "basic norm," the validity of which is presupposed. 25 H.W.R.
Wade described it as a matter of political fact.28 H.L.A. Hart gave the
Constitution which may be amended by the various techniques provided. See supra note 3.
There are no unamendable provisions. Compare U.S. CONST. art. V. Of course, an argument
may be made that the very term "amendment" involves some limitations on the degree of
change allowed. See Kesavanada v. State of Kerala, 1973 A.I.R. 1461 (India); Child, Revolu-
tionary Amendments to the Constitution, 10 CONST. REV. 27 (1926); Scott, Constituent Au-
thority and the Canadian Provinces, 12 McGILL L.J. 529, 537 (1966-67).
The discussion in the text is not intended to imply that no such supreme legal authority
existed before 1982. Quite clearly that power was in the United Kingdom Parliament. In
fact, the shift from that formal legal power, with the probabilities and uncertainties associ-
ated with its use, to a new, explicitly defined, Canadian power, with different probabilities
and uncertainties associated with its use, illustrates the critical nature of the decision being
made. See Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Compar-
ative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283-84 (1982).
23 Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 91-93 (1962) (noting the
limited nature of debates accompanying both political and scientific revolutions).
24 P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 111-12 (1966); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 103-04 (1961); K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 96 (1971); Wade, The Basis of Legal Sov-
ereignty, 13 CAMB. L.J. 172, 196 (1955).
25 H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 46-48, 194-200 (1967).
2' Wade, supra note 24, at 188; see also P. FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 58-59, 84-87,
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matter its most illuminating explanation in postulating a legal system's
rule of recognition (and it is on Hart's model that the following discussion
will be based). The rule of recognition provides the ultimate criteria for
identifying valid law but is not itself validated by prior positive law.2
7
Since this rule of recognition accounts for the binding legal force even of
the Constitution, it is plausible to refer to it as the "preconstitutional"
rule.28 In England, we might say that the preconstitutional rule is: "What
the Queen in Parliament enacts is law." In the United States we might
say, with respect to federal law, the preconstitutional rule is: "The Con-
stitution, and what the institutions of the federal government enact,
within the limits and according to the procedures of the Constitution, are
law." 29
What creates a preconstitutional rule and the criteria by which it
may be criticized cannot, for the reasons suggested, be questions of law.30
For Hart, the rule of recognition exists in a particular legal system only
by virtue of its acceptance as such. While the rule of recognition must be
regarded as law by participants acting within the system (from the "inter-
nal" point of view),3 1 its status as the ultimate rule necessarily depends
on circumstances which can only be understood from a point of view ex-
ternal to the legal system. That is to say, the establishment and identifi-
cation of the preconstitutional rule must be matters of fact.32
111-12.
27 H. HART, supra note 24, at 103-05.
2S See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
2 The examples cited are, of course, highly simplified. In the United States the failure
of the judiciary, whose determinations are accepted as binding statements of law, simply to
follow the prescriptions and proscriptions of the written constitution indicate that the text
may provide merely one component of a more complex preconstitutional rule. See Kay,
supra note 28. In any highly developed legal system the preconstitutional rule will be a
complex, compound set of criteria. See H. HART, supra note 24, at 92-93; cf. Finnis, supra
note 19, at 68-69.
so Nonetheless some commentators have referred to the underlying criteria for validity
of laws as themselves rules of the common law. See W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 156-63 (5th ed. 1959); Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional
Foundation, 31 AusT. L.J. 240 (1957); Slattery, The Independence of Canada, 5 Sup. CT.
L. REv. 379-81 (1983). While this characterization is attractive in that it conforms with the
fact that these criteria commonly show up in judicial decisions, see H. WADE, CONSTrru-
TIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 25-40 (1980), it is anomalous in that the common law itself is ordina-
rily understood to be subordinate to and alterable by statutory law. That understanding is
just one manifestation of the generally accepted view that the common law is a product of
an established legal system. As such it cannot comfortably contain the defining standards of
that system. See Wade, supra note 24, at 186-87; cf. P. FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 58-59,
84-87.
3, H. HART, supra note 24, at 107-08.
3 See id. at 106-07; Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of
Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 168-69 (1982); Slattery supra note 30, at 379-81; Wade, supra
note 24, at 188. Hart's position is to be distinguished from Kelsen's theory of the Basic
Norm. For Kelsen the validity of the ultimate norms of positive law is supplied by a "Basic
Norm," the validity of which is not demonstrated, but presupposed. See H. KELSEN, supra
1984]
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These "facts" are the attitudes of the human beings who comprise
the society in which the legal system is effective. In particular, Hart in-
sists that the officials (more prominently the judges) of the system recog-
nize the binding quality of rules which meet the criteria of the preconsti-
tutional rule. These officials must share a critical reflective attitude
toward the rule so that behavior inconsistent with it provides an occasion
for criticism. For Hart, it is not necessary that the population in general
possess such an attitude. It is enough if law, which is valid under the
preconstitutional rule is generally obeyed."3
Inquiries into the validity of a rule of law are comprehensible only
within a given legal system with a given preconstitutional rule. Such in-
quires will here be termed questions of "legality." Inquiries into the de-
sirability of a particular preconstitutional rule must have reference to at-
titudes existing in society. Such inquiries will here be termed questions of
"legitimacy."
The term "legitimacy" is used here in a rather special sense. In par-
ticular it denotes the acceptability of a preconstitutional rule in terms of
its suitability to attitudes and beliefs held in the particular society in
which the legal system is to be effective."' This is in keeping with Hart's
note 25, at 194-202. The critical difference, for our purposes, is that the Basic Norm is not
grounded in the factual circumstances and behavior of the participants of the legal system.
See id. at 208. Compare H. HART, supra note 24, at 105-06. Kelsen's position is a conse-
quence of his insistence on the impossibility of deriving a norm from a fact, an "ought" from
an "is." See H. KELSEN, supra note 25, at 193; N. MCCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 25-26 (1981); J.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 125-26 (1979). Kelsen's Basic Norm, therefore, is, as he states,
not a tool of ethical-political analysis. It is rather a logical consequence of the existence of a
legal system. See H. KELSEN, supra note 25, at 218; Kelsen, Professor Stone and The Pure
Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1128, 1142-43 (1965). The discussion in the text, which
focuses on the ethical-political factors which form the defining characteristics of a legal sys-
tem, relies, therefore, on the kind of analysis best explicated by Hart.
33 See H. HART, supra note 24, at 111-14. Particular emphasis has been placed upon the
acceptance of judicial officials and, indeed, it is in their pronouncements that the nature of a
preconstitutional rule will often be most easily discovered. Indeed, Professor Wade has gone
so far as to suggest that the preconstitutional rule can be conveniently changed by manipu-
lating the judicial oath. See H. WADE, supra note 30, at 37-39; cf. P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 25 (1977). It seems unlikely, however, that such judicial acquiescence would
issue out of a political environment which was not already hospitable to a new rule.
3 While this terminology of "legality" and "legitimacy" appears to be the most conven-
ient and useful available, it does not conform to all common uses of these words. Therefore
it is necessary to emphasize the special senses in which they are used. For example, the term
"legality" is sometimes employed to refer to qualities other than that emphasized here, i.e.,
conformity to positive law. It has been used to indicate those attributes of certainty, stabil-
ity and generality associated with the phrase "the rule of law." See L. FULLER, THE MORAL-
Try OF THE LAW 33-94 (1964); A. MATHEWS, LAW ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 3-17
(1972); Remillard, Legality, Legitimacy aild the Supreme Court, in AND No ONE CHEERED:
FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION AcT 189 (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds.
1983).
The term legitimacy is frequently used in ways both broader and narrower than that
intended here. See Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis.
[Vol. 7:111
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notion that the preconstitutional rule is determined by the attitudes and
beliefs of the participants in the legal system. Claims of the legitimacy of
a preconstitutional rule are, therefore, claims of "fit" between the precon-
stitutional rule and the characteristics of the society involved. 5
L. REV. 379, 381 n.1. First, it is common to characterize an action as legitimate if it conforms
to established positive law. See H. KELSEN, supra note 25, at 209. This usage, of course,
makes legitimacy synonomous with legality and, thus, dissolves the distinction which is be-
ing advanced. See C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIs GOVERNMENT. AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF
POLITIcs 234 (1963); Strayer, The Patriation and Legitimacy of the Canadian Constitution
3-2 (Cronkite Memorial Lectures, University of Saskatchewan College of Law, Oct. 1982)
(distinguishing "legal legitimacy" from "political legitimacy"). Debate on the Canadian Con-
stitution was particularly susceptible to this conflation because the formal legal system still
reflected a preconstitutional rule which recognized enactments of the United Kingdom Par-
liament as law. A focus on that formal system, therefore, made possible a contention that
nothing was involved beyond a mere question of law. The most prominent evidence of the
mixture of legal and political elements was the Constitutional Amendment References, 39
N.R. at 1, and in particular, its responses to the questions concerning constitutional conven-
tions. The idea that such fundamental differences about the way to define a legal system
could be resolved by a court of law, presumably by reference to the very legal system whose
definition was at issue, is, at best, a strange one. But see Colvin, Constitutional Jurispru-
dence in the Supreme Court of Canada, 4 Su'. CT. L. REV. 3 (1982). Indeed, for the reasons
suggested in the text, the Supreme Court's judgments, while of critical political significance,
ought not to be viewed as actual statements of law. See Kay, Courts as Constitution-Mak-
ers in Canada and the United States, 4 Sup. CT. L. REV. 23 (1982). This distinction be-
tween legality and legitimacy depends upon a positivist understanding of the nature of law.
That view will not be defended. Those with a different conception will find the difference
between the two kinds of arguments less convincing. See W. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANA-
DIAN CONSTITTioNAL DMEMMAS 85, 435 (1981); Knopff, supra note 8, at 41.
The second common use of the term "legitimacy," which will be avoided here, refers to
the claimed conformity of an exercise of power to some standard of general morality, not
necessarily associated with the beliefs or behavior of any particular group of human beings.
Someone using this meaning of the term would condemn, as illegitimate, any law or system
of law which violated some minimally acceptable principles of justice. See United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting); Hart, The Aims of
the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 424 (1958); see also Stillman, The Con-
cept of Legitimacy, 7 POLITY 32, 36-37 (1974). In contrast, legitimacy as used here will be
assumed to be society-specific.
35This use of the term is similar to that employed by Weber as describing a phenome-
non which is contingent on the facts of an actual society. See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 124-32 (T. Parsons ed. 1964); see also S. LnsET, POLIT-
ICAL MAN: THE SocIAL BASES OF POLITIcs 76-83 (1960); C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 34, at 233-
34; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 807-08 (1983); Stillman, supra note 34; cf. J. HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIs 95-117 (McCarthy trans. 1975) (a critical argument for a "truth-depen-
dent" test of legitimacy but one still "grounded in the consensus of the participants through
argumentation." Id. at 105); Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978)
(relevance of both fit and goodness to adjudication of difficult cases); Dworkin, Natural Law
Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982) (same as previous reference); Remillard, supra note
34, at 194 (not contingent on any independent moral and political critera).
Hart's concern with the social attitudes of participants in the legal system is in connec-
tion with the factual investigation which is necessary to identify the preconstitutional rule.
To some extent that inquiry may be conducted by an examination of the express rules of
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Although this restricted concept of legitimacy is, concededly, some-
what artificial, it does seem to capture the quality of the arguments in
Canada in 1980-82. If one separates out the legally-framed aspects of the
debate,36 it mainly centered on the consistency or inconsistency of the
various positions with Canadian tradition and values.37 This kind of con-
textual legitimacy, of course, is an enormously complex matter. For exam-
ple, Hart emphasized the critical reflective attitude of the officials ad-
ministering the law, in contrast to attitudes in the general population.
But "official" and "popular" attitudes are not independent phenomena.
Each influences, and is influenced by the other, and both must be ex-
amined in debating the legitimacy of a suggested constitutional principle.
Furthermore, the very legal system which is at issue may mold, as well as
be molded by the underlying social factors.38 Finally, those attitudes and
beliefs also will be the product of numerous, diverse and sometimes con-
tradictory factors-historical, economic, religious, geographical and so
forth. This amalgam of influences provides the political underpinning on
which any legal system must finally rest.
Obviously, this essay will not (and could not) contain the kind of
social investigation which is implicit in a consideration of the suitability
of one or another preconstitutional rule for the Canadian legal system. In
particular, there will be no attempt here to identify some set of constitu-
tional arrangements as actually achieving or failing to achieve the status
of legitimacy. Rather, the concept of legitimacy will be employed to char-
acterize a kind of argument that is utilized in periods of constitutional
change. So long as a legal system is in place, administered by the courts
and other officials, and is generally effective, its legitimacy ordinarily will
be assumed. As soon, however, as the basis of the system (not just the
validity of a particular rule) is brought into question, issues of legitimacy
the legal system and the statements of its officials. But often such information will be insuf-
ficient either because of a divergence between these artifacts and the actual operation of the
legal system or because verbal formulations are inherently inexact. See H. HART, supra note
24, at 144-50. In such cases we will need to know more about the way society works outside
the formal machinery of the legal system.
In periods of contested constitutional change, however, the task will not be descriptive
but critical, asking whether an existing or alternative preconstitutional rule is a good or bad
one. See Kay, supra note 28, at 193. Here the fit of a preconstitutional rule with the social
background will be an argument in its favor and the absence of fit will, in this terminology,
be condemned as evidence of illegitimacy.
11 See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., 124 PARa. DEB., H.C. 8512 (1981) (Can.) (statement of Prime Minister Tru-
deau on Mar. 23, 1981) ("Let me ask, first of all, if this resolution is compatible with our
traditional political values.. .") [hereinafter cited as Statement of the Prime Minister]; 124
PARL. DEB., H.C. 3302 (1980) (Can.) (statement of Mr. Epp, Opposition Constitutional Critic
on Oct. 6, 1980, comparing proposed patriation to 1867 founders who "accepted such [a
federal] arrangement because it was in accord with the political and social reality of the
nation, and I suggest to all members of the House that that reality still exists today").
" See infra notes 219-51.
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necessarily arise. This kind of argument may be of little moment so long
as such doubts are isolated. Occasions may arise when it is fair to say that
a whole society is engaged in critical discussion of the basis of its law. In
those cases the justifications and denunciations will appeal to standards
of legitimacy.
Although casting the debate of 1980-82 in terms of legitimacy cannot
produce definitive answers to the questions that were raised, recognition
that the debate was about matters of legitimacy can help clarify the na-
ture of the argument. It is valuable to demonstrate the limited part which
strictly legal arguments could have in resolving the controversy. Further-
more, it is possible to refer to at least some well-understood values and
traditions, which are widely agreed to be present in Canadian society and
to draw some conclusions about their consonance with some hypothetical
preconstitutional rules. Finally, we might conclude that, in a general way,
certain procedures and ingredients in the constitutional process are more
plausibly argued to assure the kind of fit with the social and political
facts which is necessary for the legitimacy of the resulting constitutional
rules.
Any discussion of the legitimacy of a preconstitutional rule must in-
volve an examination of two aspects-its contents and its origins. Each
must be compatible with the values and beliefs of the society whose rules
of law it governs. Thus, with regard to content, a society with a uniform
and strongly rooted tradition of belief in a revealed religion may require a
preconstitutional rule ili which the standard of valid law involves refer-
ence to an accepted medium of revelation. But even the specification of
acceptable criteria of validity might be insufficient if the rule issues from
what is perceived as a corrupt origin. Thus, a constitutional system which
provides substantively adequate rules of legal validity might be incapable
of achieving the respect needed to define the limits of the legal system, if
its historical source was the edict of a foreign conqueror. Consequently,
questions concerning the character of an existing preconstitutional rule,
as well as the probability or propriety of a change in it, necessarily de-
mand reference to the social organizations, the customs and practices, the
history and the moral and political principles of that group of human
beings who are to live under the system of law which that rule is to
define.3 9
It is now possible to restate the kinds of questions which were at
" See H. HART, supra note 24, at 106-07; J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 211
(2d ed. 1980); Finnis, supra note 19, at 69-70; Commentary, Symposium: Constitutional
Adjudication and Democracy, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 525, 537 (1981); Stillman, supra note 34.
The meaning given legitimacy, is, it will be noted, something of a catch-all incorporat-
ing all of the inexact non-legal factors which will be relied on in deciding the propriety of a
possible basis of the legal system. It, therefore does not respond to Professor Hyde's opposi-
tion between legitimacy on the one hand and other reasons for adhering to a legal system
such as "habit, fear of sanctions and individual conviction that the requested compliance is
in the actor's interest." Hyde, supra note 34, at 388.
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issue in the patriation debate of 1980-82. The proposed substantive con-
stitutional rules would govern the validity of all Canadian law, but those
constitutional rules were valid only insofar as they were created or left in
place by the amending formulas to be established. The specification of a
Canadian amending formula to replace the uncertain, informal and extra-
legal collaboration with the United Kingdom Parliament involved, there-
fore, a change in the preconstitutional rule.
Such change cannot be mere legal change.'0 No one doubted that en-
actment at Westminster provided the appropriate formal legal mecha-
nism for constitutional change.41 However, no one suggested that it alone
provided an answer to the substantive questions at issue in 1980-82. That
is, no one claimed that the new amending powers would or should acquire
their status as the governing rules of the legal system solely by virtue of
their enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament. The debate focused
instead upon the process which should take place in Canada. The argu-
ments lacked the critical characteristic of positive legal discourse.'2 They
were not addressed to the contention that one or another patriation pro-
cess conformed or failed to conform to what was agreed to be the correct
standard for constitutional change. It was, rather, the nature of that stan-
dard which was at issue. Consequently, the new constitutional amending
provisions which precisely define the final constitutional power are, (put-
ting aside the entirely formal imprimatur of the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment) based on an authority no stronger or weaker than the force of the
processes employed and the arguments made in Canada in 1980-82, none
of which acquired their potency from law.
In light of these considerations it is fair to characterize the 1980-82
constitutional change, at least in a narrow sense, as revolutionary in a
way which even major alterations authorized by law cannot be. Of course
this kind of revolution need involve no tumult or bloodshed. It may even
leave undisturbed the day to day rules and practices of political and legal
40 But see W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 438-39; Colvin, supra note 34.
41 But see infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
42 The attempt to find positive law restrictions on the capacity of any Canadian agency
or person to initiate the process at Westminster was rejected by the Supreme Court in the
"legal" aspect of the Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 1. The strictly legal
restraints, which remained were, therefore, entirely formal. It is now possible to point to the
Court's judgment on the "convention" question as specifying a pre-existing preconstitu-
tional rule which confided plenary constitutional authority to the Parliament of Canada
acting with "substantial" provincial assent. But, unlike questions of positive law, no court
can be authoritative as to the defining characteristics of the legal system of which it is a
part. See Kay, supra note 34. If the Court's standard were the accepted preconstitutional
rule, it is surprising that so few people based their claims on it in the constitutional debate.
Only one of the governments submitting arguments to the Supreme Court pressed this pos-
sibility. See Factum of the Attorney-General of Saskatchewan, Constitutional Amendment
References, 39 N.R. at 33-41; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 513a. After the decision, of
course, the Court's position became an important factor in the political process leading to
the agreement of Nov. 1981. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
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institutions. But it works changes which are literally fundamental in cre-
ating the foundations of law while resting, itself, on no law.43 The process
which led to the enactment of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 sought
to accomplish such a change. It created new and explicit rules for the
exercise of ultimate legal power in Canada. 44
The decisions on constitutional change in Canada, necessarily de-
pended not on the legality, but on the legitimacy of the competing posi-
tions. Each specified, in effect, a "candidate" for the preconstitutional
rule of the Canadian legal system. Given the reasoning above, any evalua-
tion of the different arguments must focus on both the contents and ori-
gins of hypothetical preconstitutional rules. That is, attention is required
both to the substance of the amending mechanisms suggested, and the
process by which those mechanisms would be established. 45 The argu-
ments would turn on the suitability of both the substance and the process
of each alternative in the context of Canada's social and political facts in
the 1980's. It is such suitability that provides a basis for arguing that a
fundamental constitutional rule is legitimate. And it is only this legiti-
macy-not any notion of pre-existing legality-against which fundamen-
tal constitutional change may be measured.
An examination of the events leading to the establishment of the
Constitution of the United States in 1787-89 reveals the difference be-
tween arguments of legality and legitimacy in constitutional change with
unusual lucidity. In the Canadian constitutional debate, however, these
two forms of evaluation were less precisely distinguished. The American
experience will be considered first.46
43 "Fundamental" derives from the Latin verb, fundare, "to lay the bottom," and refers
to "a principle, rule, law or article which serves as the groundwork of a system." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTioNARY 1019 (2d ed. 1934). It is in this, ne plus infra
sense, not merely in its importance, that the preconstitutional rule is fundamental.
44 It may be that this kind of change necessarily takes place whenever the constitu-
tional amendment power is altered, even when accomplished in accordance with the prior
amending procedure. This is the problem investigated by Alf Ross in Ross, On Self-Refer-
ence and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MiaN 1 (1969). But cf. Hart, Self-Referring
Laws, in FESTSKR T TILLAGNAD KARL OLWECRONA 307 (1964). See W. LEDERMAN, supra note
34, at 438-39; Colvin, supra note 34.
" That is, one might find an actual amending procedure acceptable on its face but still
object to it because it derived from a source of authority thought inappropriate. See Still-
man, supra note 34, at 41. This appeared to be the position of Professor Lederman who
found some variant of the "Victoria" amending formula proper but was unwilling to approve
its imposition by the federal government without some measure of provincial consent. See
W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 85-86.
49 Comparative treatment always involves the risk of over-emphasizing either similari-
ties or differences. That risk is exacerbated when the subjects are separated by time as well
as geography. This should be borne in mind in what follows. It will be contended that, at
root, the two processes dealt with a similar question. To support that claim the parallels will
be heightened better to focus on the way it was resolved in each case. Of course, with re-
spect to other kinds of investigations those likenesses will be of considerably less
importance.
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IV. THE CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 1787-89
There are great seasons when persons with limited powers are justified in
exceeding them, and a person would be contemptible not to risk it.
Edmund Randolph, 1787'7
A. The Articles of Confederation
The first legal frame of government for the union of the thirteen
southern colonies of North America was submitted by the Continental
Congress to the various state legislatures on November 15, 1777.48 Sixteen
months earlier Congress had declared those colonies to be "free and inde-
pendent states" having full power to do the "things which independent
states may of right do."'49 The Articles were to have no effect until ac-
cepted by every state legislature. Largely due to differences over various
state claims to western lands, the last state did not approve the Articles
until March 1781.50 This ratification brought into being for the first time
the legal entity known as "The United States of America." The Articles
defined the legal nature of that entity for eight years until the institution
of the new constitutional government in 1789.51
The nature of that first constitution was clear from the face of the
document itself. The Articles established a "perpetual" union of the
states and granted some significant, but limited, national powers to a
Congress of state delegates in which each state had a single vote and in
which no important action could be taken without the assent of nine
states. The Articles declared that "each state retains its sovereignty, free-
dom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in
Congress assembled. '52 Any change in the Articles themselves required
the unanimous agreement of the state legislatures. 3 The Articles, there-
fore, while establishing a substantial federation for its time,5' did not cre-
ate a national government, in any modern sense, but "a firm league of
friendship. '55
The difficulties and shortcomings of the Confederation government
47 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 262 (1966).
48 R. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 98 (1961).
49Declaration of Independence, para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
50 B. BAILYN, D. DAvIS, ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC 304 (1977) [hereinafter cited as B.
BAILYN & D. DAvIs].
5' M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 239 (1940).
52 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (U.S. 1781).
:3 Id. at art. XIII.
' Note, The United States and the Articles of Confederation: Drifting Toward Anar-
chy or Inching Toward Commonwealth?, 88 YALE L.J. 142 (1978).




have been recounted many times. 6 Although it oversaw important accom-
plishments in the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War and the
organization of the Northwest Territories, it was, in a literal sense, consti-
tutionally incapable of dealing adequately with the persistent problems
facing the country. Any successful economic policy was precluded by the
failure to give the Congress authority to tax, to regulate commerce or to
control credit, and by an inability to deal with the delinquency of many
states in their financial contributions. With respect to international rela-
tions, the central government was incompetent to establish national tariff
or trade policies and this resulted in a serious disadvantage in competing
or negotiating with other countries. In all of these matters, the division
and conflict of political authority was a major obstacle to progress. More-
over, the state governments, to which most important public decision-
making had been confided, were increasingly prone to inefficiency and
corruption and, consequently, to diminished public respect.5 7 In the last
years of the 1780's, it was widely perceived that any solution to these
difficulties would involve a significant augmentation of national power.5 8
In January 1786, the Virginia legislature proposed to her sister states
that a convention be held in Annapolis in September to consider solu-
tions to the commercial problems plaguing the confederation.5 9 Only five
states sent delegates. They merely proposed to Congress that it call an-
other convention to be held in Philadelphia the following spring to con-
sider not just commercial matters, but "to devise such further provisions
as shall appear to [the delegates] necessary to render the constitution of
the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union.' 's Par-
tially in response to the argument that such a convention was contrary to
the lawful procedure for constitutional amendment provided in the Arti-
cles, Congress, for a time, ignored the request. By February 1787, how-
ever, a majority of the states had elected delegates to the convention.
Congress then issued a call for a convention for "the sole and express
purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Con-
gress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein
as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render
the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the
preservation of the union."'
The main features of the deliberations and agreements which took
place in that extraordinary convention in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787 are now well known to every student of American history. The dele-
' See, e.g., B. BAiLYN & D. DAVIs, supra note 50, at 325-29, and sources cited id. at 350.
But see Note, supra note 54.
67 See B. BAILYN & D. DAvis, supra note 50, at 325-28.
IS Id. at 329.
" M. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONsTrruTION 33 (1964).
THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 264 (Bourne ed. 1901); C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 61-63 (1913, MacMilian Press ed. 1936).
01 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13-14 (1966).
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gates proposed an entirely new government and, at their suggestion, the
plan was not submitted to the state legislatures but was ratified by spe-
cially elected conventions in each state.12 When the ninth state, New
Hampshire, ratified in June 1788, the Constitution by its own terms,
could come into effect. Shortly thereafter, when Virginia and New York
followed suit, the inauguration of the new regime was assured. 3 In the
spring of 1789, the new government was organized and the Constitution
became the supreme law of the land.6 4
B. The Legality of the Constituent Process
1. The Convention of 1787
The transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution
was the institution of a new legal system premised on significantly differ-
ent political principles. Since the final authority of the state legislatures
which underlay the Articles was scrapped, this change was more than a
mere legal revision under a continuing preconstitutional rule. The extra-
legal character of the change was understood even prior to the convention
and helps explain Congress' reluctance officially to initiate such an unor-
thodox technique of constitutional change.6 5
The same recognition surfaced early in the deliberations of the con-
vention itself. On May 29, Edmund Randolph of Virginia put before the
convention three resolutions proposing a wholesale replacement of the
Confederation by a strong national government.6 The suggestion that the
convention even consider such a radical change raised a serious question
which the plan's opponents were quick to point out. The Congressional
resolution calling the convention, as well as the instructions to a number
of state delegations, restricted the convention's mission to "revising the
Articles of Confederation and reporting . . .alterations and provisions
therein. ' 6 7 Randolph's "Virginia Plan" proposed replacement, not revi-
sion. To approve the resolution, therefore, Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina argued, would mean "their business was at an end."68 William
Paterson of New Jersey warned the delegates that they "ought to keep
within [the Articles'] limits, or [they] should be charged by [their] con-
stituents with usurpation .... [T]he people of America were sharp-
sighted and not to be deceived."6 9 The objection was put sharply in an
anti-constitutional tract published during the ratification debate:
62 M. JENSEN, supra note 59, at 102-05.
" Id. at 138-39.
64 R. Momus, supra note 48, at 121.
68 See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
66 See M. JENSEN, supra note 59, at 39-42.
67 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 61, at 13-14.
15 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 39.
69 Id. at 178; Remarks by E. Gerry, id. at 42-43; Remarks by J. Lansing, id. at 249; M.
JENSEN, supra note 59, at 42-43, 52-57.
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They [the Convention] had no other authority to act in this matter than
what was derived from their commissions-when they ceased to act in
conformity thereto they ceased to be a federal convention, and had no
more right to propose to the United States the new form of government
than an equal number of other gentlemen, who might voluntarily have
assembled for this purpose-the members of the convention, therefore,
having the merit of a work of superogation, have thereby inferred no
kind of obligation on the States to consider, much less to adopt this plan
of consolidation. The consolidation of the union! What a question is this,
to be taken up and decided by thirty-nine gentlemen who had no pub-
lick authority whatever for discussing it!7°
In reply, the advocates of the new constitution made a half-hearted
legal argument. Madison asserted that the new government was not so
different from the Confederation government and was a mere "altera-
tion.' 7 1 "The truth is," he later wrote, "that the great principles of the
Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered as less abso-
lutely new than as the expansion of principles which are found in the
Articles of Confederation. '72 The critical legal question, however, was not
whether the Constitution was "absolutely new" but whether it could rea-
sonably be construed as a "revision" of the prior instrument. That it was
more than this is a matter of little doubt. The supporters of the Constitu-
tion also sought comfort in the language of the Congressional authoriza-
tion, which had called on the convention to propose such alterations as
would "render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of
Government and the preservation of the Union. ' 7 3 That being the con-
vention's charge, Randolph argued, "it would be treason to our trust, not
to propose what we found necessary."7 4 Given the deficiencies in the ex-
isting government, a delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention
explained, "[ilt was found impossible to improve the old system without
changing its very form. '7 5 However, in light of the strict and specific lan-
guage of the Congressional call, this liberal interpretation was highly im-
plausible. It is hard to dispute the common sense of John Lansing's ob-
servation that "N[ew] York would never have concurred in sending
deputies . . . if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a con-
solidation of the States, and a National Government. '76
70 Letters of "A Republican Federalist," in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 114 (C. Kenyon ed.
1966).
71 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 314.
72 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 268. For a modem argument that there
was significant continuity between the Articles government and the new Federal govern-
ment, see Note, supra note 54, at 160-65.
73 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 14.
7' Id. at 255.
75 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 61, at 351 (remarks of R.D. Spaight in North Carolina
Convention, July 30, 1788); see THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 248-49 (Madison);
M. DIAMOND, THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIc REPUBLIc 23 (1981).
76 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 249.
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If the legal argument on behalf of the convention's actions was un-
convincing, other non-legal justifications would have to be devised. Some
supporters of the convention's proposal minimized the importance of any
departure from the legally established procedure on the grounds that the
resulting recommendations had no juridical significance. Hamilton felt no
difficulty because "[w]e can only propose and recommend-the power of
ratifying . . .is still in the states.""' The convention, Madison wrote, was
"merely advisory and recommendatory," and its proposal was "of no more
consequence than the paper on which it is written. '7 8 This was, of course,
a concession and not a response to the claim of ultra vires.
Other defenders met the accusation more boldly. The convention's
trespass of its legal boundaries was justified by the gravity of the situa-
tion facing the country and the incapacity of existing institutions to meet
it. Colonel Mason insisted that in "certain crises . . .all the ordinary
cautions yielded to public necessity."79 He pointed to the 1783 Treaty
with Great Britain during the negotiation of which the American envoys
had exceeded their powers but in so doing had "raised to themselves a
monument more durable than brass."80 In The Federalist No. 40,
Madison stated:
[The delegates] must have reflected, that in all great changes of estab-
lished governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid
adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nuga-
tory the transcendant and precious right of the people to "abolish or al-
ter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness," since it is impossible for the people spontaneously
and universally to move in concert toward their object; and it is therefore
essential that such changes be instituted by some informal and unautho-
rized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or
number of citizens.81
"That is," concluded Charles Beard, commenting on this language, "the
right of revolution is, at bottom, the justification for all great political
changes.""s
2. The Ratification Process
The legal incapacity of the convention was only the beginning of the
alegality which permeated the process which established the Constitution,
7 Id. at 295; to the same effect, see id. at 253 (remarks of J. Wilson).
78 THE FEDERALiST No. 40, supra note 60, at 252 (Madison).
7, 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 338.
80 Id.
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 252-53 (quoting the Declaration of
Independence).
82 C. BEARD, supra note 60, at 223; see also id. at 223-25; Palmer, The American
Revolution: The People as a Constituent Power, in THE E-INTERPETATION OF THE AmRi-
CAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789, at 356-57 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
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for the proposed Constitutional draft was, itself, inconsistent with the ex-
isting law of constitutional change. The states under the Articles retained
such extensive powers of self-government that it is not inapt to describe
the Articles government as an association of sovereign entities.8 3 This is
not to say, however, that the states had not submitted to limitations con-
tained in the Articles themselves or that that commitment was revocable
by any means not specified in the Articles. Article 13 made this clear:
Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in
Congress assembled, on all questions which, by this confederation, are
submitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be invio-
lably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall
any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such
alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be after-
wards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."
The convention did not propose an "alteration" consistent with this
Article. It did submit its product to Congress, but not for approval.
Rather it was hoped that Congress would simply transmit the draft to the
states. Moreover, under the terms of the proposed Article VII, state ap-
proval was to come not from the legislatures, but from conventions
elected especially for that purpose in each state. Finally, even the state
conventions would not have to approve unanimously. The agreement of
nine states would be sufficient to make the Constitution effective "be-
tween the States so ratifying."8 5 These departures from legality were fully
recognized and understood by participants in the convention and ratify-
ing debates.
One of the most hotly argued issues in Philadelphia involved what
form the report of the convention to Congress ought to take. The ratifica-
tion article reported to the convention by its committee on detail called
for the Constitution to be submitted to the Congress "for their approba-
tion."86 Since each state cast a single vote in Congress and since unanim-
ity would, doubtless, be required, the prospects for this form of ratifica-
tion were practically non-existent. The convention modified the article so
that it provided simply that the Constitution be laid before Congress, but
not for approval or disapproval. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts warned
that Congress would take "just umbrage" at being so casually removed
from the constituent process. 87
The majority, however, did not prize legality among its most impor-
tant objectives. Indeed the illegality of the process was a good reason for
bypassing Congress. Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania claimed this
procedure would "save Congress from the necessity of an Act inconsistent
63 See M. JENSEN, supra note 51, at 174-76.
2 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (U.S. 1781).
8' U.S. CONST. art. VII.
96 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (1966).
87 Id. at 560. Gerry found an ally in, of all people, Alexander Hamilton.
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with the Articles of Confederation under which they held their author-
ity."88 In the end any embarrassing reference to the Congress-or indeed
to any of the institutions or rules of the Confederation-was simply omit-
ted. The convention approved a letter to be sent to Congress with the
draft Constitution: "We have now the Honor to submit to the Considera-
tion of the United States in Congress assembled that Constitution which
has appeared to us the most advisable."89 No mention was made of the
power of the convention or the legality of the ratification procedure. In
both respects the document spoke for itself.
Congress received the proposal three days after the convention
adjourned:
[W]ith no unseemly expression of pleasure; indeed, as Bancroft says, it
had been in reality invited "to light its own funeral pyre." No body can
be expected to decree gladly its own demise; but there seems to have
been no special desire on the part of the moribund Congress to prolong
its own futile life."
Nevertheless, the opposition voiced in Congress was harsh. Richard
Henry Lee, one of the Constitution's most effective opponents, denounced
the Philadelphia delegates as "monarchy men . . . aristocrats and
drones" and reminded the Congress that it was being asked to acquiesce
in the "subversion of the constitution under which they acted."9 1 Lee's
argument, however, was unsuccessful. To avoid the unseemliness of "de-
creeing its own demise," Congress transmitted the Constitution to the
state legislatures without any recommendation.92
The subsequent ratification procedure, calling for the approval of
conventions in nine states, departed from the amending procedure of the
Articles in two ways: by eliminating any substantive role for the legisla-
tures and by dispensing with unanimity. Oliver Ellsworth noted this de-
parture from legality in the convention and urged that the Constitution
be treated as an amendment to the Articles to be approved by the state
legislatures. Gouverneur Morris responded directly: Ellsworth's position
"erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confed-
eration. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation. '93 Similarly,
with regard to unanimity, Gerry "urged the indecency and pernicious ten-
dency of dissolving in so slight a manner. If nine out of thirteen can dis-
solve the compact, six out of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new
8 Id.
89 Id. at 583.
90 A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (1935).
9' M. JENSEN, supra note 59, at 121.
92 Id.
93 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 86, at 92. It was further argued that, since the new consti-
tution might work some changes in state constitutions, the legislatures which existed under




one hereafter."9' Morris responded again. He agreed that as a matter of
law less than unanimous consent of the legislatures under the Confedera-
tion would make any alterations null and void. But an appeal to the peo-
ple outside the established legal system could alter the federal compact
"in like manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered
by a majority of the people of the State."' 5 Furthermore, since the Con-
stitution would only bind the states which did ratify, no state would be
coerced into the new system.98 These responses, of course, did not argue
that the ratification was legal but that it was desirable, legal or not. In the
Federalist No. 40, Madison readily conceded the legal necessity of unani-
mous agreement under the Articles but suggested that the requirement
was so foolish as to "dismiss it without further observation."'
In short, the entire constituent process was undertaken without legal
sanction and, in significant part, in contradiction to law. In essence, it was
an exercise in revolutionary change and no less so because accomplished
by caucuses and conventions rather than by force of arms.98 Charles
Beard summarized this point:
If today the Congress of the United States should call a national conven-
tion to "revise" the Constitution, and such a convention should throw
away the existing instrument of government entirely and submit a new
frame of government to a popular referendum, disregarding altogether
the process of amendment now provided, we should have something
analagous to the great political transformation of 1787-89. The revolu-
tionary nature of the work of the Philadelphia Convention is correctly
characterized by Professor John W. Burgess when he states that had
such acts been performed by Julius Caesar or Napoleon they would have
been pronounced coups d'gtat.9
C. The Legitimacy of the Constituent Process
The justifications for revolution, of course, cannot be justifications of
law. 00 Rather, they must rely on considerations of justice, policy or ne-
' Id. at 561. The impropriety of dissolving the confederation by less than unanimous
consent was also put forward vigorously in the ratification debates. See, e.g., The Address
and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to
Their Constituents, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIsT, supra note 70, at 33 n.1, and the remarks of
William Lancaster in the North Carolina Convention, id. at 415-16.
95 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 86, at 92.
" Id. at 469 (remarks of J. Madison and J. Wilson).
97 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 251; see Dellinger, supra note 22, at 284.
"1 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
" C. BEARD, supra note 60, at 217-18. Professor Brown took issue with Beard's adop-
tion of the term "coup d'6tat" but conceded that "the whole procedure from the meeting of
the Convention to the adoption of the Constitution was illegal from the standpoint of the
Articles of Confederation." R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF "AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION" 141 (1956).
o0 That is, in the positive law sense discussed above. Revolution may be, and often is,
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cessity which outweigh the demands of legality. James Wilson of Pennsyl-
vania, subsequently one of the nations's first great authorities on consti-
tutional law, told his fellow delegates at Philadelphia that "[t]he House
on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary
rights."' 011 While a revolution may never be legal, the weightiness of the
reasons for it and the respect for the forces that initiated it may make it
legitimate in the sense discussed above. For the reasons already sug-
gested, this legitimacy depends upon the particular values and traditions
of the society involved and, unlike matters of law, can never be the sub-
ject of any authoritative pronouncement by courts or legislatures.
The political actors who brought the Constitution into effect were
well aware of the need for political, non-legal justifications for their ac-
tions. This is not to say that the abandonment of the established amend-
ing procedures was primarily based on the framers' appreciation of the
jurisprudential underpinnings of constitutional law. Practical politics was
a substantial consideration. The sweeping changes the framers desired
simply could not acquire the approval of every legislature. James Wilson
was blunt: "I am not for submitting the national government to the ap-
probation of the state legislatures. I know that they and the state officers
will oppose it."''
But it would be an injustice to the founding fathers to suggest that
their choice of methods was based on nothing more than crass, tactical,
political factors. Their arguments for replacing Congressional and legisla-
tive approval with ratification by popularly elected, ad hoc conventions
show that they understood that their proposed reform was more than just
a revision within a continuing legal system. They knew that they were
laying the foundation of a new legal system; that they were engaging, in
this sense, in a revolution. They were consciously setting out what they
hoped would be a new preconstitutional rule. This being the case, it was
clear to them that the decision was a political one and had to be sup-
ported with political arguments. Consequently, they were willing to re-
place the "irrelevant" rules of the system because, as Gouverneur Morris
said, "this Convention is unknown to the Confederation.' 0 3 Instead, the
accompanied by the rhetoric of the law. This was surely the case with the American Revolu-
tion. But the "legality" appealed to there was, in essence, a variety of "natural law." See
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolution-
ary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
101 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 86, at 469.
102 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 47, at 379. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 86, at 90 (re-
marks of N. Gorham); id. at 562 (remarks of J. Wilson); M. JENSEN, supra note 59, at 69.
The political aspects of the ratification procedure were not lost on its opponents. Luther
Martin, in his "Genuine Information" delivered to the Maryland legislature in Nov. 1787,
noted that "the warm advocates of this system, fearing it would not meet with the approba-
tion of Congress" and legislatures bypassed those bodies in order "to force it upon them, if
possible through the intervention of the people at large." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 61, at
228.
'o, 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 86, at 92.
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real debate had to take place, in Wilson's language, "upon original
principles.' '0 4
The original principle upon which the advocates of the constitution
relied was, above all, the sovereignty of the people.10 5 Although there were
differences as to its application, this concept was the universal dogma of
American political thought at the end of the eighteenth century. On this
idea the very independence of the American nation was founded. The
Declaration of Independence recited the "self-evident" truth that govern-
ments "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" and
affirmed the ineradicable "right of the people to alter or abolish" their
governments and to institute a new one "on such principles and organiz-
ing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their safety and happiness."'0 6 James Wilson, writing in 1791, distin-
guished the sources of authority on which the British monarchy was said
to rest-an original contract between the king and the people, divine
right, or even "the dark foundations of conquest"-from the only legiti-
mate source of governmental power in America: "With us the power of
magistrates, call them by whatever name you please, are the grants of the
people.' 0 7
The mere invocation of the sovereignty of the people, however, could
not justify jettisoning the legal rules of the Articles and bypassing the
Congress and the legislatures. Those institutions too could claim the au-
thority of the people. In the late eighteenth century the classical notion of
mixed government composed of institutions representing the different in-
terests in society had given way to the idea that every organ of govern-
ment derived its power solely from the sovereign people. 0 8 How, then,
could an appeal to the people be the basis of an argument for circum-
venting their elected representatives? For ordinary decisions of law and
government the ordinary lawmaking institutions might be adequate sur-
rogates for the people. But when, in a constituent process, the character
and powers of those institutions themselves were at issue, it was natural
(if not logically necessary) that they be viewed as defective vehicles for
the expression of the popular will.'09 If constituent questions were in the
1" 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 61, at 143 (statement in the Pennsylvania Convention).
105 See id. at 142-43; JENSEN, supra note 51, at 55.
10, Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
107 Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 316-17 (McCloskey ed.
1967).
I" For a perceptive discussion of the changing nature of the recognized authority for
government in this period in American history, see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). The older view was expounded by John Adams who de-
fended constitutions mixing popular, aristocratic and monarchical elements. The newer view
was exemplified in a criticism of Adams by John Stevens: "Government was not a balancing
of people and aristocracy but only the distribution and delegation of the people's political
power.... For Stevens the parts of government had lost their social roots. All had become
more or less equal agents of the people." Id. at 584.
109 See id. at 276.
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hands of the ordinary legislatures it was incongruous to regard those leg-
islatures as controlled by the resulting constitutional law."10 It followed
that neither Congress nor the legislatures could be competent entirely to
redefine their own relative powers. To do this, the people would have to
speak with an alternate voice, one which was independent of, and which
would transcend the agencies of government which were to be abolished
or created."'
The method for expressing the alternate, constituent voice in the
United States had become obvious by 1787. This was the special constitu-
tional convention. The revolution itself had been the product of ad hoc
committees and assemblies." 2 While post-independence constitution-
making in the states had, at first, been the work of the existing legisla-
tures, the theoretical unsoundness of this technique was increasingly rec-
ognized," 3 and special constitutional conventions were utilized." 4 These
assemblies could act outside of, and thus assert an authority prior to, the
regular agencies of government which they were to define and limit. Fur-
thermore, because of the peculiar nature of their task they could lay a
special claim to represent the people in their constituent capacity. 5 "It
was an extraordinary invention," the historian, Gordon Wood has written,
"the most distinctive institutional contribution it has been said, the
American Revolutionaries made to Western politics. It not only enabled
the Constitution to rest on an authority different from the legislature's
but it actually seemed to have legitimized revolution.""' American politi-
cal thought had already accommodated the propriety, in certain circum-
stances, of revolutionary resort to force. Now revolution had "become do-
mesticated in America."1 7  The people could act peacefully and
110 See id. at 276-81; R. PALMER, THE AGE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 340 (1969).
1 R. PALMER, supra note 110, at 354-57.
"z See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 252-53; G. WOOD, supra note 108, at
313-31. The spontaneous organization of the people of a community for the purpose of lay-
ing down the fundamental definition of their government goes back, in American history, as
far as the Mayflower Compact in 1620 and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1639.
See Arendt, Constitutio Libertatis, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION, 1763-1789, at 579 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
" See G. WooD, supra note 108, at 276-309. Col. George Mason of Virginia saw a dan-
ger to the primacy of any Constitution founded on the exercise of the ordinary lawmaking
powers of the state legislatures. 2 M. FARRADm, supra note 86, at 88-89.
114 See G. WOOD, supra note 108, at 318-43.
115 See id. at 328-31. For some contemporary observers the element of fiction in the
distinction between the people represented in government and the people represented in
convention was evident. Noah Webster asked what was special about a convention. It was
only "a body of men chosen by the people in the same manner they choose members of the
Legislature, and commonly composed of the same men; but at any rate they are neither
wiser nor better. The sense of the people is no better in a convention than in a legislature."
Quoted in id. at 379.
116 Id. at 342.
117 R. PALMER, supra note 110, at 356. See C. BEARD, supra note 60, at 222-25; Corwin,
The Worship of the Constitution, 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 55 (Loss ed. 1981); Del-
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legitimately outside the legal channels of political change.
The submission of the proposed constitution to special ratifying con-
ventions in the states, therefore, swept away any legal objection to the
Constitution. The people's constituent power was always held in reserve
and could undo whatever legal and governmental systems it had created:
From [the people's] authority the Constitution originates; for their safety
and felicity it is established; in their hands it is clay in the hands of the
potter; they have the right to mould, to preserve, to improve, to refine
and to finish it as they please. If so, can it be doubted that they have the
right likewise to change it?118
On this view, the failure to follow established forms ceased to be a defect,
it was, instead, the ratification process' great virtue. In fact, it was not the
legitimacy of the Constitution which was in doubt. Rather, it was the Ar-
ticles, which had issued, not from special institutions reflecting the origi-
nal will of the people, but from the acts of ordinary legislatures which
rested on a questionable footing. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No.
22:
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal
system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no
better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures it has been
exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its
powers, and had, in some instances, given birth to the erroneous doctrine
of a right of legislative repeal .... The possibility of a question of this
nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national gov-
ernment deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority.21Y
The new Constitution would be approved by the people themselves and
their "approbation [would] blot out antecedent errors and
irregularities.""1 2
Of course it is possible to discern some distance between the abstract
idea of the consent of the people and the actual ratification procedure in
linger, supra note 22, at 289-90.
118 Wilson, supra note 107, at 304. Compare the argument of Luther Martin against the
legitimacy of ratification by ad hoc conventions:
[O]nce the people have exercised their power in establishing and forming them-
selves into a State government, it never devolves back to them, nor have they a
right to resume or again to exercise that power, until such events take place as
will amount to a dissolution of their State government.... [The proposed ratifi-
cation procedure] has a tendency to set the State governments and their subjects
at variance with each other, to lessen the obligations of government, to weaken
the bands of society, to introduce anarchy and confusion, and to light the torch of
discord and civil war throughout this continent.
L. Martin, Genuine Information, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 61, at 230 (emphasis in
original).
11 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (Bourne ed. 1901).
120 THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 60, at 233 (Madison). See G. WooD, supra note
108, at 533-34.
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state conventions. Even if we put aside our modern conviction that the
definition of "the people" ought not to be restricted by considerations of
race, sex and wealth, 121 significant questions remain about the results of
1787-89. It seems clear there was some chicanery in the process. 122 Esti-
mates of the proportion of the population actually favoring the Constitu-
tion are largely guesswork but most observers agree that the division was
a close one. 23
These real questions, however, are largely beside the point under
consideration. The concern here is with the extent to which the ratifica-
tion process contributed to the legitimacy of the new Constitution in light
of its patent departure from the legality of the Confederation. The debate
on the Constitution was a truly national one and, for the intelligence and
intensity which the opposing sides brought to it, was remarkable for any
time and place. 12 That debate culminated in the state conventions. The
decisions made by majorities at those conventions were the best devices
available for approximating what would be perceived by winners and
losers alike as the popular will. The result was that the Constitution was
regarded as the product of a process in which the ultimate source of legit-
imacy, the sovereignty of the people, was expressed as fully and as clearly
as the accepted political beliefs and institutions of the time allowed.1 5
To summarize, the establishment of the United States Constitution
in 1787-89 illustrates plainly the distinction between legality, which is
only meaningful within a given legal system, and the legitimacy of a
change in the legal system which must be based on political and social
considerations. This clarity is a result of the obviousness of the existing
legal rules for change and the candor with which the framers rejected
them. The reaction of anti-Federalists to the breach of legality was vocif-
erous. 12 The advocates of the Constitution could not respond to these
critics on their own terms. The unavailability of a legal defense forced to
the surface the contention that the Articles could not control the will of
the people, that no system of law could govern the authority from which
it derives.27
V. THE CREATION OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION: 1980-82
I think at this point we hear them say, "Well, it may be legal. Maybe
121 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 6 (1980).
122 See J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-88, at 187-
248 (1961).
123 See id. at 249; C. BEARD, supra note 60, at 237-38; M. JENSEN, supra note 51, at 138-
46.
124 See M. JENSEN, supra note 51, at 122; J. MAIN, supra note 122 passim.
121 The rapidity with which the Constitution came to be accepted evidences the accept-
ability of the ratification process in terms of the political values of the period. See infra
notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
126 See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 70.
127 Cf. Ross, supra note 44.
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that is the way it has always been done. Maybe technically, in law, you
can do it. But"-and then we use the big notion--"it is not legitimate; it
is legal but it is not legitimate."""
Pierre E. Trudeau, 1981
As the United States in the 1780's struggled to find a foundation
upon which to rest an effective structure of law and government, so did
Canada, over a much longer period in the twentieth century, struggle to
arrive at a process or authority which could authorize and control an en-
tirely Canadian Constitution. Those problems were brought to a head in
1980 when the federal government announced its intention to take steps
to patriate the Constitution and establish a Charter of Rights on the sole
Canadian authority of the Houses of the Federal Parliament and, point-
edly, without the consent of the governments or legislatures of the prov-
inces. The decisions which followed determined a new shape for a final
and plenary authority over all Canadian law. They thus prescribed a new
preconstitutional rule. In that debate, and in retrospect, for reasons al-
ready discussed,12 9 questions of legitimacy appear at the heart of the
controversy.
A. The Relevance of Legality in Patriation
It has already been argued that an independent legal system must
ultimately be premised on political and social circumstances and cannot,
in the final analysis, rest on a claim of legality.'2 0 The establishment of
the United States Constitution illustrated that distinction with unusual
clarity given the explicit rejection of the legal constraints of the Articles
and the plain articulation of the political justification for the creation of
the new regime.
An examination of the events in Canada in 1980-82 would, at first,
seem to belie this claim with respect to the institution of the new Cana-
dian Constitution. The debate centered, in substantial degree, on the res-
olution of what were seen as questions of law. There was, moreover, al-
most no explicit recognition that the matter could not be resolved by
recourse to legal rules. This attitude may be attributed to the largely un-
questioned decision to effect the constitutional change through the formal
legal mechanism of amendment by the United Kingdom Parliament. This
context had the result of structuring the argument to produce an undue
concentration on form to the neglect of the substantive sources of the
power to establish a Constitution.
The fact that a foreign law exists authorizing the constitutional ar-
rangements of another country is, however, hardly conclusive on the
"' Statement of the Prime Minister, supra note 37.
12 See supra notes 19-46.
"3 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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question of the basis of the legal system of that country. 3 1 If it were, the
authority of the United Kingdom over the independent members of the
Commonwealth would be unimpaired and the legitimacy of their govern-
ments would be traceable to some continuing attitudes of fealty to the
English Queen in Parliament. No one in Canada believes that any sub-
stantive power over Canadian affairs has existed at Westminster for many
years. 1 2 Reverence for the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament
is no part of the reason that Canadian law is effective in Canada.133
In light of these considerations it is ironic that the federal govern-
ment's principal justification for its proposed unilateral action was le-
gal.' 3' This contention was premised on the fact that all Canadian consti-
tutional rules were founded, directly or indirectly, on British statutes and
that the sole right to alter those arrangements was in the United King-
dom Parliament. Moreover, that right could be exercised on anyone's ini-
tiative, and no rule of law prevented any one from asking for any amend-
131 See J. RAZ, supra note 32, at 127-28; Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law,
in ETHICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 179-93 (H. Kiefer & N. Munitz eds. 1970); Knopff, supra note
38, at 59-60.
1'2 Knopff, supra note 8, at 52-53; Slattery supra note 8, at 396-99; Kennedy, The Stat-
ute of Westminster, 45 JuRID. REV. 330, 338 (1933).
M Hart states:
It is still true that much of the constitutional structure of the former colony is to
be found in the original statute of the Westminster Parliament: but this is now
only an historical fact, for it no longer owes its contemporary legal status in the
territory to the authority of the Westminster Parliament. The legal system in the
former colony has now a "local root" in that the rule of recognition specifying the
ultimate criteria of legal validity no longer refers to enactments of a legislature of
another territory. The new rule rests simply on the fact that it is accepted and
used as such a rule in the judicial and other official operations of a local system
whose rules are generally obeyed.
H. HART, supra note 24, at 117.
The role of the United Kingdom Parliament in the amendment of the Canadian Consti-
tution might be characterized not as the maintenance of a formal colonial relationship but
as a feature of a domestic, Canadian legal procedure in which Westminster acts as an agency
of Canadian law. See Slattery, supra note 30, at 401. This would not change the basic argu-
ment in text. For under this view it is equally true that the British Parliament's role is
entirely formal and that an emphasis upon it, instead of upon the non-legally defined Cana-
dian attitudes and behavior, would give a misleading picture of the patriation process as one
governed by positive law.
134 J. CHRETIEN, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE AMENDMENT OF THE CANA-
DIAN CONSTITUTION 5 (1981) (official publication of Canadian Ministry of Justice) ("Canadi-
ans take pride in the fact that our Constitution unlike those of many nations, is entirely
lawful both in its origins and its subsequent development"); W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34,
at 85 ("If we are to have legitimate as distinct from revolutionary change, then the present
method of amendment focused on London should be followed one last time." Id. at 88.);
Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, supra note 11, at 63 ("The Parliament of the
United Kingdom has full legal authority over amendments to the Constitution of Canada.
And, because there is no amending power conferred on any Canadian authority to amend
certain parts of the Constitution, the Parliament of the United Kingdom has the sole legis-




On its own terms this argument is as unexceptionable 3 ' as was the
contention that the ratification and institution of the United States Con-
stitution was a breach of legality. However, the substantive inadequacy of
this position, which was based on the legal competence of Westminster to
define Canadian law, is clear. The formal legal authority of the United
Kingdom Parliament over Canada is colonial authority.'3 One fact upon
which every responsible participant in the Canadian constitutional debate
agreed was that, as a political matter, Canada was a sovereign and inde-
pendent nation. 38 If there were ever a case where legality was insufficient
to confer legitimacy, this was it.
It may be objected that a procedure has now been established by
which a new legal system may, in fact, be founded on an act of law. More
particularly, a colonial authority might, by a legal act of abdication, pur-
port to establish an independent legal system in a former colony." 9 In-
deed, the United Kingdom has consistently utilized such legal formulas in
recognizing the independence of its former colonial territories. Such abdi-
cation amounts to a permanent renunciation of legal authority and may
be likened to the execution of a deed in which dominion over property is
irreversibly transferred to another person. The Canada Act 1981 contains
such an abdication clause declaring that henceforth "[no] Act of the Par-
liament of the United Kingdom . . . shall extend to Canada as part of its
law." 40
It seems clear that such an action cannot, itself, be the actual source
of authority for the new legal system. Where political events have, in fact,
so changed attitudes and behavior that adherence to the rules of the legal
15 The Canadian parliamentary address to the Queen, on this view, was of no juridical
significance at all. It was, argued counsel for the federal government before the Supreme
Court of Canada, indistinguishable, as a matter of law, from a parliamentary birthday greet-
ing to the Queen. R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 100.
'' Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 50 (Majority Law).
157 See Manitoba Constitutional Amendment Reference, [1981] 2 W.W.R. 193, 250, 7
Man. R.2d 269, 330-31, 117 D.L.R.3d 1, 53 (O'Sullivan, J.A., dissenting); Kerr, Constitution
Act, 1980: Is it Constitutional?, 30 U.N.B. L.J. 73, 86 (1981); Knopff, supra note 8, at 50-51.
A different view is possible. See supra note 133. Even if the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment's authority is rooted in Canadian law, the universally acknowledged lack of substan-
tive competence, makes reliance on this formal legal power alone an inadequate justification.
" See J. CHRETIEN, supra note 134, at 5; HOUSE OF COMMONS (U.K.), FIRST REPORT
FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAms COMMrrrEE, 1980-81: BRiTisH NORTH AMERICAN ACT-THE ROLE
OF PARLIAMENT xvi; Slattery, supra note 30, at 390-96.
'3' S. DESMITH, CONsTrruTioNA AND ADM INsTRATvE LAW 85-87 (4th ed. 1981); P.
HOGo, supra note 33, at 26-27. Justice Rand suggested that the Imperial Conferences of
1926 and 1930 and the Statute of Westminster amounted to such a legal abdication in the
case of Canada and the other Dominions. Rand, Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutional-
ism, 38 CAN. B. REV. 135 (1960). The same idea underlies the often quoted dictum in
Ndlwana v. Hofmeyr, 1937 A.D. 229, 237, that "[f]reedom once conferred cannot be
revoked."
11 Canada Act, 1981 § 2.
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system cannot be attributed to any subsisting obligation to the law of the
mother country, abdication is no more than a formal solution to a formal
problem. It corrects the paper record to reflect the actual understanding
of the relevant legal actors.14 If, on the other hand, it is the act of abdica-
tion that really accounts for adherence to the rules of the new legal sys-
tem, it will then be ineffective as a true abdication. The authority of the
new system continues to rely entirely on the felt obligation to the prior
regime, which might, by the same token, re-assert its authority and again
legislate directly for the colony.242
Two examples may make this more clear. The legal action establish-
ing the independence of the United States was the Treaty of Paris of
1783 (or, by some accounts, the repeal of the Declaratory Act of 1766 in
1964).' 43 It is clear though that the basis of legitimacy of the United
States legal system in 1783 (and certainly in 1964) was not the belated
recognition of the British Crown. In contrast, the United Kingdom Par-
liament declared in the Ireland Act of 1949 that Northern Ireland would
not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the
Parliament of Northern Ireland. In 1973, however, the United Kingdom
Parliament repealed that provision in the course of re-establishing direct
British rule in Ulster, and replaced it with a guarantee defeasible only on
"the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland, voting in
a poll.'' 4 4 Parliament's previous legal renunciation of complete control
over the fate of the province was insufficient to prevent this unilateral
change in the conditions of Northern Ireland's legal existence. It did not,
therefore, effect an irreversible transfer of that aspect of sovereignty from
the British to the Northern Ireland legal system.145
141 See Blackburn v. Attorney General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1382 (Denning, J.), quoted in
Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 32 (Majority Law); S. DESMITH, supra
note 139, at 76-77; H. HART, supra note 24, at 117.
142 See Ross, supra note 44, at 5-6; cf. J. FAwcErr, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1963). Of course, if the autonomy-conferring organ simultaneously
dissolves itself, as might be the case in a succession of legal systems in the same society, the
problem is considerably more complicated. See S. DESMrrH, supra note 139, at 84; Ross,
supra note 44 passim.
It is possible that the abdication itself might so alter political beliefs that, after a time,
resumption of authority will no longer be possible. In that event, of course, it will not be the
legal but the social-psychological aspects of the abdication which will be effective.
141 See S. DESMITH, supra note 139, at 75.
14 Quoted in Hood-Phillips, Self Limitation by the United Kingdom Parliament, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 445 (1975).
148 See id. at 472. The Irish legislation was not in the same form as modern Indepen-
dence Acts, and the grant was, in no way, one of independence. But the comparison is still
instructive as to the indeterminacy of the effect of a purported permanent renunciation of
legal power. In the case of Rhodesia, the attempt to withdraw a similar legislative pledge of
self-government was ineffective because of significantly different political and social circum-
stances. See R. v. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S.A.L.R. 515. In the case of attempted abdication by
the United Kingdom, a further difficulty is presented by what is commonly advanced as an
axiom of British constitutional law that no parliament may bind its successor. See S.
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Thus, legal abdication is either a formal or a futile action. Indeed, it
might be argued that in cases like that of Canada, where actual political
and legal independence is beyond dispute, legal abdication should be
avoided because it obscures the fact of independence, appearing to leave
open the possibility of the re-assertion of colonial control. 4" It may be
argued that such legal forms should purposely be spurned in favor of for-
mal actions which are explicitly illegal in terms of the prior system. That
is, legal forms should mirror political reality. The only truly independent
legal system, on this view, is an autochthonous one in which the precon-
stitutional rule is formally, as well as actually, rooted in domestic political
authority.14
7
In any event, these considerations go only to the form in which a
separate legal system is established. Once the autonomy of a legal system
is conceded, it is a separate question as to what is its actual (political)
basis. Whether Canada's independence was to be recognized by abdica-
tion of the United Kingdom, or by extralegal declaration at home, did not
affect the critical question of constituent authority in 1980-82: "What ex-
isting sources of Canadian authority are competent to establish the con-
stitutional rules which will govern the legal system of Canada and
changes in it?" An inquiry into that underlying question had to consider
the sociology, history and political morality of Canada.'48 It was a matter
not of legality, but of legitimacy.
B. The Legitimacy of the Patriation Process
1. Alternative Bases of Legitimacy
Given the multifaceted nature of an inquiry into the legitimacy of
the basis of a legal system, the possibilities in a complicated, developed
society are legion. In the United States in 1787-89, near universal accept-
ance of the concept of popular sovereignty and the established role of the
ad hoc convention quickly focused the debate. In Canada, the argument
in 1980-82 resolved itself into a choice between only two possibilities.
One, associated with the federal government, posited that the federal
Parliament, by itself, was a proper source for the establishment of funda-
mental legal rules. The second, advocated by the dissenting provinces,
DESMITH, supra note 139, at 84-87.
14 See J. FAWcETT, supra note 142, at 94.
17 See id. at 94-96; S. DESMITH, supra note 139, at 74-75; H. WADE, supra note 30, at
29; Finnis, supra note 19, at 50-51. Consideration was given to the desirability of an autoch-
thonous source of Canadian law in G. FAVREAU, supra note 14, at 51-53. See also Russell,
Bold Statescraft, Questionable Jurisprudence, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DE-
MOCRACY AND THE CoNsTIUTION ACT 210, 233 (K. Banting & R. Simeon eds. 1983). An at-
tempt was made to secure both autochthony and legality in the formula proposed for effect-
ing the ill-fated "Victoria" amending formula in 1971. See Strayer, supra note 34, at 3-14 to
3-15. A clear discussion of the problem is found in P. HOGG, supra note 33, at 24-26.
"I See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
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contended that legitimate constituent authority had to include both the
federal Parliament and the legislatures or governments of the
provinces. 19
There was very little discussion in the constitutional debate of any
other possible device for instituting new constitutional rules. In particu-
lar, the only options seriously coDsidered involved agreement among one
or another combination of existing governmental institutions. In a society
with widely shared democratic principles, one might have expected con-
sideration of some extraordinary decision-making mechanism, some ana-
logue of the American Constitutional Convention, to insure an exception-
ally broad degree of consensus. Such a wide consensus would be less
likely to emerge from the assent of ordinary majorities of representatives
elected for ordinary governmental purposes. 1 0 In fact, the existing gov-
ernmental agencies might be thought particularly ill-suited to making
fundamental permanent constitutional rules since these agencies would
tend to be biased toward short term, partisan considerations. 51
In contrast, one of the most salient features of the process leading to
the United States Constitution was the deliberate bypassing of existing
governments, both state and federal, in favor of a form of direct recourse
to "the people outdoors" exercising its power through extraordinary con-
ventions. 52 Since that time, such exceptional procedures have been the
rule in national constitution-making. Some utilization of special constitu-
tional conventions or assemblies and popular approval in a referendum
represents the most common technique to establish modern
149 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 2-3.
150 A.V. Dicey writes:
It is, I think of immense importance that people should realize that a small and
transitory political majority, though it necessarily exercises the power, has not the
authority of the nation.... [O]n matters of constitutional change I do not think a
small majority has any moral right to act with vigour. The presumption is in fa-
vour of the existing state of affairs, because on the whole it may be assumed to be
the permanent will of the nation. Add to this that a constitutional change once
made is, or ought to be, final, and therefore ought not to be made by any body of
men who do not clearly represent the final will of the nation.
A.V. Dicey to L. Maxse, Jan. 1, 1895, quoted in R. COSGRovE, THE RuLE OF LAW: ALBERT
VENN DIcEY, VICTORIAN JuIsT 161 (1980). An argument that popular approval in a referen-
dum is required to assure the legitimacy of basic constitutional reform is made in Remillard,
supra note 34, at 200-01. See also Whitaker, Democracy and the Canadian Constitution, in
AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 240 (K. Banting
& R. Simeon eds. 1983); Kerr, supra note 137, at 90.
151 See Cairns, Constitution-Making, Government, Self-Interest and the Problem of
Legitimacy in Canada (H. Clarke & A. Kornberg eds. compilation as yet untitled) (forth-
coming, Duke); Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making: The Canadian Experience, in
REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (K. Banting & R. Simeon
eds.) (forthcoming, Macmillian) [hereinafter cited as Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-
Making]; Whitaker, supra note 150.




But since constitutional legitimacy turns on actual attitudes towards
the source and content of a governing constitutional rule, any inquiry
must be specific as to time and place and will depend upon the traditions
and values of the particular society whose legal system is under study.'"
The history of government in Canada has revealed a consistent satisfac-
tion and pride in parliamentary democracy. What little experience Ca-
nada has had with referenda has not been completely happy. 55 Conse-
quently, the failure of Canada to resort to such procedures is not entirely
surprising.
2. Unanimous Governmental Consent
Little controversy existed as to the sufficiency of the process for in-
stituting constitutional change advocated by the dissenting prov-
inces-unanimous agreement among provincial and federal governments.
Only its necessity was put into issue. Indeed the propriety of this proce-
dure had been, more or less, taken for granted for many years in the con-
tinuing discussions on the establishment of a domestic amending proce-
dure.' 5 This position was often associated with the contention that
confederation represented a compact among the provinces which could
not be altered without the consent of the contracting parties. This "com-
pact theory" has often been attacked as lacking any basis in law.'5 7 But
for questions of constitutional legitimacy, questions of law cannot be de-
terminative. There is little doubt that, in terms of the history and politi-
cal values of Canada, the compact theory represents an important fact.15 8
"' Although it never emerged as a prominent theme, there was some advocacy of ex-
traordinary, ad hoc procedures in the Canadian constitutional debate. It was at one time
thought that Prime Minister Trudeau might be considering a referendum to bypass the
provincial officials. See MACLEAN'S, June 23, 1980, at 18-19; Kerr, supra note 137, at 90. As
early as 1922, Sir Clifford Sifton suggested a special constituent assembly with subsequent
approval in a referendum. Sifton, Some Canadian Constitutional Problems, 3 CAN. HIsT.
REv. 3, 9-10 (1922). Professor Lederman has also discussed the possibility of a constituent
assembly but, remarkably, suggested that it could only operate within limits agreed upon by
federal and provincial authorities, and even then, only if authorized by the United Kingdom
Parliament. W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 88.
'5 As to the relationship of changed attitudes and values to arrangements previously
regarded as legitimate, see infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
,55 Most prominent was the referendum on conscription in World War I which revealed
a marked discrepancy between the preferences of French and English speaking Canadians.
K. McNAUGHT, THE PELICAN IISTORY OF CANADA 267 (1976). Professor Lederman contrasts
such extraordinary procedures with those "that [arise] naturally out of our history and tra-
ditions and which [use] our existing legislative and executive institutions of government."
W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 89; see Strayer, supra note 34, at 33-34.
"6 See P. GERIN-LA OIE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 168 (1950); Alexander,
A Constitutional Straitjacket for Canada, 43 CAN. B. REv. 262, 268 (1965).
157 Bastedo, Amending the British North America Act, 4 CAN. B. REv. 209, 212-19
(1934).
'58 "Theories whether of a full compact theory.., or of a modified compact theory...
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Constitutional events since before confederation in 1867 have taken into
account an assumed irreducible minimum of provincial political auton-
omy. Moreover, various political interests have found expression through
provincial officials. 159 When concentrating on legitimacy as opposed to le-
gality, therefore, "[i]t is a matter not of 'the federal compact' but of the
'federal principle.' "160 The creation of a constitution by unanimous agree-
ment of all governments in Canada with formal enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament would have aroused little dispute about its
legitimacy.161
3. Unilateral Action by the Federal Parliament
Given the inattention to non-governmental alternatives and the lack
of controversy over the adequacy of the provincial position, the constitu-
tional debate in Canada in 1980-82 centered on the expressed intention of
the federal government to establish new constitutional arrangements on
the sole initiative of the houses of the federal Parliament. 1 2 As noted,
this procedure was defended as a lawful means of changing the Constitu-
tion. But its advocates also claimed that given the history and values of
Canada, the federal plan was a politically appropriate means of establish-
ing and defining a basic constitutional authority for the Canadian legal
system. These were arguments of legitimacy.
One aspect of this defense was the fact that the federal Parliament
was the sole political institution in Canada in which all the people were
represented. This argument supported a claim that the federal Parlia-
ment could democratically express the will of the Canadian nation. 63 The
appeal of this argument, however, was severely limited. Opponents
pointed out that Parliament was elected under the existing constitutional
system, in which its powers were restricted to subjects specified in the
British North America Acts.1 ' Those topics were not commonly under-
operate in the political realm, in political science studies. They do not engage the law .....
Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 52 (Majority Law).
'59 See G. STANLEY, A SHORT HIsTORY oF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 91-96 (1969);
Kennedy, The Imperial Conferences, 1921-1930: The Statute of Westminster, 48 L.Q. Rv.
191, 208 (1932).
160 Wade, Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee (U.K.) (Dec. 10, 1980).
161 As has been noted, in addition to the procedure originating them, the substance of
any new constitutional rules could not, consistent with a plausible claim of legitimacy, be
radically out of line with well established Canadian political traditions, including the preser-
vation of the federal structure. Unanimous assent, however, would surely have been gener-
ally thought sufficient to legitimate any of the various amending formulas seriously dis-
cussed in 1980-82.
142 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 66-70.
1,3 "Through the one institution in which all Canadians are represented, the Parlia-
ment of Canada, Canadians can break the deadlock among their eleven governments."
Statement by Prime Minister Trudeau on Constitutional Change (Oct. 2, 1980); see Cairns,
The Politics of Constitution-Making, supra note 151.
'" See Kerr, supra note 137, at 81; Schwartz, supra note 8; General National Agree-
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stood to include a plenary constituent power. Certainly the 32nd Parlia-
ment sitting in 1980-82 was not elected as a constituent assembly, but to
carry out the ordinary business of government.
The burden of the argument on behalf of unilateral action by the
federal Parliament rested on precedent. Its proponents asserted that
throughout Canadian history the agreement of the House and Senate of
Canada had been a necessary and a sufficient condition to amendment of
the British North America Acts. While conceding that, on occasion, the
consent of provincial officials had first been sought and secured, these
incidents were explained as measures of short-term political prudence
and not prerequisites to the legitimacy of the proposed amendments.
The correct interpretation of these precedents became subject of in-
tense argument and extensive commentary"6 5 and was the subject of the
opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Constitutional Amend-
ment References. One of the three principal questions raised in those
cases concerned the existence of a constitutional convention requiring
provincial consent. 168 That question amounted to the presence or absence
of certain political preconditions to the exercise of what was assumed
(and had been decided) to be legal governmental power-the power to
request an amendment from the United Kingdom Parliament. And since,
as has been argued, that power was to be exercised to establish the basis
of an essentially new constitutional regime, the question was one of con-
stitutional legitimacy in the sense described above.16 7
It should be noted that the relevance of those precedents to an evalu-
ation of the proposed federal actions of 1980-82 is problematic. There is a
critical difference between enacting substantive amendments to an ex-
isting constitutional system and- by specifying a new amendment proce-
dure, a new ultimate legal authority,-the founding of an essentially new
system." 8 What might be an adequate procedure for the former might
still be deemed insufficient for the latter. But even assuming their materi-
ality, the inferences drawn by the federal government as to the political
lessons of the amending history appear to have been mistaken.
On the surface, the federal explanation was impressive. Since 1867,
the British North America Acts were amended by the United Kingdom
Parliament twenty-two times. 6 9 Of those amendments, only four were re-
ment: The Legal Sanction for Constitutional Reform in Canada, 6 QUEENS L.J. 513a (1981).
1,5 See, e.g., the various opinions in Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at
13-14; Kerr, supra note 137; Schwartz, supra note 8. The most thorough study of past
amendments is P. GERIN-LAJoIE, supra note 156. A much cited discussion is the "White
Paper" prepared by the federal Minister of Justice in 1965. G. FAvREAu, supra note 14.
141 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 13-14.
117 "Question 2 is not confined to an issue of pure legality but has to do with a funda-
mental issue of constitutionality and legitimacy." 39 N.R. at 196; see also id. at 192-93.
', See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
'" What exactly amounts to an amendment to the Canadian Constitution is not clear.
British statutes amending the British North America Act, other British statutes affecting
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quested after the consent of all the provinces had been secured.'1 0 But to
look only at this raw statistic may be misleading.
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the only relevant
precedents were those amendments in which the powers of the provinces
had been explicitly reduced. When those amendments were examined, it
was found that provincial consent had always been present.'1 ' This deter-
mination may have been the result of a limited reading of the particular
convention the Court was asked to consider. In particular the majority
ignored amendments which, while not dealing expressly with provincial
power, might have had a significant adverse effect on relative provincial
authority.1
2
But a more expansive inquiry into the promulgation of prior amend-
ments leads to the same conclusion.173 When considering a possible legiti-
mate source of constituent power in a legal system, certain historical ma-
terial is necessarily irrelevant. Precedents occurring at a time when
prevalent attitudes and beliefs about proper government authority were
significantly different, cannot illuminate the current perceptions that
must support a claim of legitimacy.'7 4 In particular, the political basis of
events occurring prior to the independence of the Canadian legal system
can be of little assistance. By definition, those acts were premised on a
preconstitutional rule which included the propriety of substantive partici-
Canada and mere orders-in-council have all been included. See P. GERIN-LAJom, supra note
156, at 47. Twenty-two is the number used in G. FAVREAU, supra note 14, at 5-7. It has been
accepted as an appropriate list by all the members of the Supreme Court of Canada. See
Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 199-203 (Majority Convention), 268-72
(Dissent Convention).
170 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 276 (Dissent Convention). See A
Paper on Constitutional Amendment and Patriation 7 (Public Affairs Division, Canadian
Embassy, Washington, D.C., Oct. 1980).
171 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 205-08 (Majority Convention).
1'2 In the Manitoba and Newfoundland references the Court was asked about amend-
ments "affecting federal-provincial relationships or the powers, rights or privileges granted
or secured by the Constitution of Canada, to the provinces, their legislatures or govern-
ments." The question in the Quebec reference dealt with amendments that "affect ... the
legislative competence of the provincial legislatures in virtue of the Canadian Constitution
[or] the status or role of the provincial legislatures or governments with the Canadian Fed-
eration." 39 N.R. at 187. The dissent suggested that a broader reading was called for and
felt that amendments that had a significant impact on provincial interests ought to be in-
cluded among the relevant precedents. Id. at 272 (Dissent Convention).
173 The Court's inquiry with respect to a constitutional convention was reduced to a
rather narrow and formulary exercise inappropriate to the less easily defined question of
legitimacy considered here. See Colvin, supra note 34, at 17. This approach to conventions
became even more pronounced in the Matter of a Reference to the Court of Appeal of Que-
bec Concerning the Constitution of Canada. Attorney-General of Quebec v. Attorney-Gen-
eral of Canada, 140 D.L.R.3d 385 (Can. 1982); see infra notes 214-15 and accompanying
text.
174 That is to say, arguments about legitimacy raise questions necessarily peculiar to
the perceptions and attitudes existing at the time the constitutional arrangements are
brought into question. See infra notes 219-51 and accompanying text.
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pation by the United Kingdom in the determination of the law of Ca-
nada. The timing of Canadian legal independence is the subject of appar-
ently endless discussion, but for the purpose of evaluating the relevance
of events leading to prior constitutional amendments, a reasonable line
may be drawn between the amendments of 1916 and 1930.175 It is fair to
say, that for some period ending after 1916, it would have been mislead-
ing to speak of a legitimate constituent power in Canada which excluded
the political authority of the United Kingdom.17 6 The procedures leading
to amendments in colonial Canada, when every agreement and action
took place under the shadow of potential colonial intervention, can say
very little about what creates a legitimate constituent power in indepen-
dent Canada.
The record of amendments subsequent to 1916 provides far less com-
17 See Strayer, supra note 34, at 3-8 to 3-9 ("So in this interlude between the wars it
was clearly confirmed that the political legitimacy for Canadian constitutional amendments
must be found in Canada").
Drawing the line between the 1916 and 1930 amendments ignores the Statute Law Re-
vision Act 1927 which repealed two obsolete provisions of the British North America Act
and was passed with no consultation in Canada at all. See P. GERIN-LAJoIE, supra note 156,
at 129-31.
A much cited opinion on the time of independence is that of the Supreme Court of
Canada: "There can be no doubt now that Canada has become a sovereign state. Its sover-
eignty was acquired in the period between its separate signature on the Treaty of Versailles
in 1919 and the Statute of Westminster in 1931." In re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral
Rights, 1967 S.C.R. 792, 816. An official government publication asserted that independence
was practically complete by the end of the First World War though not "formally an-
nounced" until the Balfour Declaration of 1926. G. FAVREAU, supra note 14, at 17. There are
plenty of other opinions. See P. HOGG, supra note 33, at 2-3 n.5; Slattery, supra note 8, at
390-92.
The absence of legal independence before World War I is evidenced by the events lead-
ing to the amendment of 1907. While the explanation of those events is subject to dispute, it
is clear that language not proposed by federal authorities was inserted in London by the
Colonial Office. This was done, at least in part, in response to complaints by the government
of British Columbia. See HousE OF COMMONS (U.K.), FIRST REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, supra note 138, at xxiii, xxxiii; P. GERIN-LAJoJE, supra note 156, at 80-83. But
see J. CHRETIEN, supra note 134, at 27.
Indeed even a 1931 date for independence may be too early. With respect to foreign
affairs, considerable ambiguity as to Canadian autonomy continued for some time. Indepen-
dent Canadian diplomatic relations were not common until after the onset of the Second
World War. See G. STANLEY, supra note 159, at 181. While independent diplomatic repre-
sentation was instituted in Washington in 1927, it was not raised to the ambassadorial level
until 1943. Id. Great significance is placed on Canada's separate declaration of war in 1939 a
week after the British declaration, thus establishing that Canada could abstain while the
United Kingdom was at war. See id. at 192; W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 79; K. Mc-
NAUGHT, supra note 155, at 263. But this aspect seems far outweighed by the fact that
Canada did go to war only one week later, entering a conflict when its own national interests
were not obviously in immediate peril, and although Canadian leaders had been questioning
the wisdom of participation in any European war. Id. at 260-63. Without doubt what
brought Canada into the Second World War in 1939 was not any independent consultation
of its own interests but the fact that the United Kingdom was at war.
176 See P. HoGG, supra note 33, at 3, 13-14.
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pelling support for the claim of the federal government. Of the ten
amendments initiated in Canada since 1916, five were secured only after
the agreement of all provincial governments, and one was obtained only
after agreement among all the provinces directly involved.1 7 The amend-
ment providing the closest parallel to the decisions of 1980-82 was the
Statute of Westminster of 1931 which gave statutory form to the political
and legal independence of the Dominions of the British Common-
wealth.' 78 The specifically Canadian provisions of the statute were in-
cluded precisely to dispel any inference that the statute would have
vested constitutional amending power in the federal parliament alone.
True to that purpose, those provisions were drafted in response to provin-
cial concerns and only after agreement between the federal and provincial
governments.
17 9
It is true that four amendments in the post independence period
were obtained without provincial consent and in some cases over provin-
cial protest.'8 0 The Supreme Court of Canada discounted the importance
of these precedents on the grounds that the amendments at issue did not
directly reduce the legislative powers of the provinces.' 8 ' It may be that
the Court did not adequately consider the indirect effect these amend-
177 See Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 203-05. The Amendment of
1930 confirmed provincial ownership of natural resources in Manitoba, British Columbia,
Alberta and Saskatchewan and was assented to by the federal Parliament and the legisla-
tures of those four provinces. Although questions were raised in the debate in the federal
Parliament as to the need for consent by other provinces, this amendment is included here
with those amendments receiving unanimous agreement because the federal government's
response to those questions, emphasized that the amendment had no effect beyond those
four provinces, cf. infra note 183 and accompanying text, and also that there had been
unanimous, although informal, approval by the provincial governments at the Dominion-
Provincial Conference of 1927. See P. GERIN-LAJom, supra note 156, at 92-93.
This listing omits the Statute Law Revision Act, 1950 which repealed an obsolete provi-
sion of the British North America Act, 1867, and was enacted without prior consultation
with Canadian officials. See Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 202-03 (Ma-
jority Convention).
178 See P. GERIN-LAJom, supra note 156, at 186-88.
179 Accounts of the process leading up to the drafting of section 7 of the Statute of
Westminster may be found in Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 39-47; G.
FAVREAU, supra note 14, at 19; P. GERIN-LAJom, supra note 156, at 92-104; P. HOGG; supra
note 33, at 18. In J. CHRErIEN, supra note 134, at 8-9, it is argued that the provinces feared
only that the Statute might hinder some possible legal change from the existing practice of
unilateral amendment requests to a procedure in which the provinces could play a substan-
tial role. No authority and no specific statements or events are cited for this interpretation.
180 The British North America Act, 1943 postponed any redistribution of seats in the
House of Commons pending termination of the war. The British North America Act, 1946
altered the formula for reapportionment of House seats set up in the 1867 Act. The British
North America Act, 1949 (No. 1) effected the inclusion of Newfoundland as a province. The
British North America Act, 1949 (No. 2) gave the federal Parliament power to amend the
constitution in certain respects. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.




ments had on the interests of the provinces.182 But, as indicators of the
accepted sources of legitimate constitutional change, it is noteworthy that
in every case the federal authorities, themselves, justified their actions by
reference to the insignificance of the changes the amendments worked on
the basic features of the Constitution.' s" Thus the amendment of 1949,
empowering the federal Parliament in certain cases to amend the Consti-
tution, was defended largely in terms of the breadth of its exceptions,
which excluded inter alia the powers of the provinces." 4 Indeed the 1949
amendment's exclusions may be argued to have "constitute[d] an admis-
sion by the federal Parliament itself of its incompetence to deal with such
matters.
'18 5
Therefore the procedures used to secure amendments since indepen-
dence failed to support convincingly the legitimacy of unilateral federal
constituent power. Moreover, in the same period the federal government
consistently refused to seek an amending formula in the absence of unan-
imous provincial consent. Twice what appeared to be general agreement
dissolved when a province withdrew its assent and, on each occasion, no
further action was taken."8 ' The repeated failure to achieve federal-pro-
vincial agreement on a domestic amending procedure over the last fifty
years and the accompanying perception of constitutional stalemate are
strong testimony to the prevailing understanding of what was required to
institute legitimate constitutional change.
1 87
181 See id. at 272-74 (Dissent Convention).
183 With respect to the amendment of 1943, see G. FAVREAU, supra note 14, at 13; P.
GERIN-Lom, supra note 14, at 13; Note, The Latest Amendment to the British North
America Act, 24 CAN. B. REv. 609, 612-13 (1946). The record with respect to the amendment
of 1949 effecting the union with Newfoundland is more ambiguous. However, the inclusion
of Newfoundland in the confederation by order-in-council had been authorized by section
146 of the original 1867 Act. Thus although the actual union departed, in some ways, from
the arrangements originally comtemplated, the action still had some sanction in the Act. A
motion in the Canadian House in 1949 to consult the provinces was defeated. In the Senate
a government spokesman referred to union as a "matter of national concern.., assigned by
the Constitution to the federal authority." P. GERIN-LAjoE, supra note 156, at 121-29. As to
the second amendment of 1949, see infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
184 See GERIN-LAJom, supra note 156, at xvi-xxi.
185 Id. at xxxii.
"'1 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 205; P. HoOG, supra note 33, at
21.
I,' In addition to the failed attempts to agree on an amending formula, the refusal of
the federal government to go forward with substantive amendments in the absence of unani-
mous agreement illustrates the same point. The Amendment of 1940, vesting in the federal
Parliament the power to institute a scheme of unemployment compensation, was delayed
more than two years while the necessary unanimity was secured. See Constitutional
Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 204 (1981) (Majority Convention); P. GERIN-LAJoE,
supra note 156, at 106-08.
Professor Knopff put the point clearly, speaking in terms of the existence of a conven-
tion of provincial consent:
When Prime Minister Trudeau announced his government's initiative on national
television, for example, he spoke of "the tyrant" of unanimity as the chief cause of
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4. The Accord of November 1981
a. Debate and Consensus
The insistence of federal officials on proceeding with a method of pa-
triation which was valid according to formal legal rules, but vulnerable to
substantial arguments of illegitimacy produced a protracted, confusing
and often virulent debate on the constitutional underpinnings of the Ca-
nadian political and legal system.188 While either unanimous provincial
agreement or unilateral federal action would have been fairly easy to eval-
uate in terms of constitutional legitimacy, the process and result which
finally emerged from that debate is not susceptible to so obvious a judg-
ment. The final agreement (approved with minor modifications) was
among the federal government and nine provincial governments omitting
only, but significantly, the government of Quebec.8 9 This agreement,
however, was not entirely the result of free bargaining because it took
place against the background of the federal government's continuing ex-
pressed intention to take the matter to London on its own.190 Therefore
the resulting constitutional arrangements are subject to continuing ques-
tions of legitimacy.
These questions cannot focus exclusively on the final decision-mak-
ing conference. The agreement concluded there is properly understood
only as the culmination of a process which took more than a year. The
main ingredients of that process can be roughly listed to give an idea of
its character. The Federal Provincial Conference of September 1980 arose
out of the Quebec referendum on "sovereignty-association." That referen-
dum was, itself, a traumatic event for Canadian politics, concentrating
the national attention on matters of constitutional self-definition.81 The
unilateral federal initiative that followed the failure of the 1980 confer-
ence began an extensive national discussion. The proceedings in the fed-
eral Parliament contributed to that discussion in at least two ways. The
reference of the government's proposed resolution to a special joint
House-Senate Committee resulted in lengthy and widely publicized hear-
ings. These provided a forum for detailed and many-sided arguments
about the nature of Canadian legal and political values. All kinds of inter-
ests, economic, racial, cultural, philosophic and political, sent representa-
tives to this unusual seminar. 92 As a result, the government's proposed
"fifty-three years of constitutional paralysis" and insisted that a solution required
that the tyrant be deposed. But one need not (indeed one cannot) depose a tyrant
who is not in power.
Knopff, supra note 8, at 43.
188 Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making, supra note 151.
189 Government of Quebec, Decree No. 3214-81 (Nov. 25, 1981).
'90 See Cairns, supra note 20, at 21-22, 37-38.
l" R. ZuKowSKy, supra note 8, at 32-33.
192 Id. at 73; Strayer, supra note 34, at 3-4.
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Charter of Rights underwent substantial changes. 193 The other contribu-
tion was the debate in the House of Commons. At the very outset, the
government modified its resolution to gain the support of the House's
third party.1 9 4 Subsequently the opposition pressed parliamentary proce-
dure to its limits to emphasize its objections to the plan. These objections
centered, above all, on the legitimacy of the process employed.195
Concurrently with the debate in Parliament, the dissenting provin-
cial governments carried out their own campaign of opposition. Theirs
was no easy alliance. Despite common opposition to the federal plan,
these provincial leaders had to debate and reconcile their own visions of
Canada which were, by no means, in harmony.1 9s
The opposition of the provincial governments included the institu-
tion of reference lawsuits in the Courts of Appeals of three provinces.
This resulted in decisions adverse to the provincial position in two cases
and favorable in a third.197 The latter judgment, in conjunction with the
parliamentary tactics of the federal opposition, contributed to an agree-
ment by the federal government to postpone final action in Parliament
until the Supreme Court of Canada could render its opinion on the ap-
peal.198 That heteroclite judgment provided a critical element in the polit-
ical process leading to the final agreement. The Supreme Court judgment
strengthened the hand of the federal government by endorsing the legal-
192 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 81-82.
1,, Within days after the federal initiative was announced, the government at the re-
quest of the parliamentary leader of the New Democratic Party made changes further
strengthening provincial control over natural resources. In return, the Federal New Demo-
cratic Party caucus supported the government position for the remainder of the process. Id.
at 69.
"5 The leader of the opposition summarized his position this way:
We in this party stood against [the government's constitutional] proposal because
that proposal was wrong for two fundamental reasons: First, that proposal breaks
the principle of partnership in this country. We are a federal nation, that is the
history and nature of Canada and you are not a federal nation in fact and in spirit
if you give, as Mr. Trudeau wants to give, the power to one level of government,
Ottawa, to change the fundamental law of the land without any recourse at all to
[the provinces].... Secondly, their measure is wrong because it asks the British to
decide questions which the people of this country should decide.... Mr. Trudeau
and Mr. Chretien have indicated they are going to try to push stubbornly on,
against the opposition of the provinces, against the opposition of the public, to try
to change the Constitution in the personal way that Mr. Trudeau wants it
changed.
Address by the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark to the Nova Scotia P.C. Annual Meeting (Jan. 17, 1981).
196 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 92; Cairns, supra note 20, at 17-20.
1,7 Judgments favorable to the federal position were rendered in Reference Re Amend-
ment of the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 2 W.W.R. 143, 7 Man. 2d 269, and Reference Re
Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 120 D.L.R.3d 385 (Que. Ct. App. 1981). A judg-
ment favorable to the opposing provinces was rendered in Reference Re Amendment of the
Constitution of Canada, 29 Nfld. & P.E.I. 503, 82 Atl. Prov. 503, 118 D.L.R.3d 1 (Nfld. Ct.
App. 1981).
118 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 104.
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ity of its proposed action. But, in finding that it would amount to a
breach of a constitutional convention, it drastically increased the force of
the argument that such action was illegitimate. As one opinion noted,
conventions exist precisely "to ensure that the legal framework of the
Constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitu-
tional values or principles of the period."'199 This kind of inquiry was, to
say the least, an odd one for a court of law.200 But once the judgment was
rendered it became extremely influential in the subsequent course of
events. This may have been due to the Court's prestige, acquired in ordi-
nary adjudication, or to a perception of the Court as the only agency ca-
pable of intelligent and dispassionate consideration of the nature of con-
stitutional change. Whatever the reason, the Court's decision and
reasoning became an important part of the standards by which the legiti-
macy of any scheme for constituent action would be judged by the other
relevant political actors. 10 '
All of these events were accompanied by an unending stream of com-
mentary and criticism, academic and journalistic, in every form of the
popular media.'0 ' The result was a long, loud and intense national sympo-
sium on the constitutional fundamentals of the Canadian state. It would
be hard to imagine a process in which so many viewpoints were expressed
and taken seriously in so many different forums. It seemed that every
interest and argument were constantly colliding at different speeds and
angles with every other interest and argument. Every position was chal-
lenged and, to some degree, refuted by the others. The constitutional
rules which emerged from this apparently chaotic process reflect their
multilateral formation. Finally, an entrenched constitutional system
emerged which was in its substantive terms only slightly different from
what had generally been perceived as the Canadian status quo before the
constitutional debate.
20 3
This was certainly not a rational constitutional reform imposed by a
single guiding intelligence. 0 4 But a cogent challenge to the new constitu-
199 Constitutional Amendment References, 39 N.R. at 192 (Majority Convention). See
Banting & Simeon, Federalism, Democracy, and the Constitution, in AND No ONE
CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION AcT 2, 7 (K. Banting & R. Simeon
eds. 1983); Strayer, supra note 34, at 3-21 to 3-31.
200 See Kay, supra note 34. But see Colvin, supra note 34.
21 See Kay, supra note 34, at 32-33; Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making,
supra note 151; Russell, supra note 147, at 210.
202 R. ZUKOWSKY, supra note 8, at 124; Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making,
supra note 151.
203 See Cairns, supra note 20, at 29; Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making,
supra note 151. This in no way alters the fundamental character of the change made by
specifying a preconstitutional rule. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
210 Cairns states:
[T]hose who seek the guiding spirit or the real intentions of the Fathers of our
limited re-Confederation will search in vain for a dominant animating vision.
There is none to be found. The Constitution Act does not transcend competing
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tion's legitimacy is not thereby advanced. As Burke argued, while a priori
constitutions may appear appealing in the abstract, the merits of a new
constitution rest in its fit with the flesh and blood people who must live
under it.20 5 Given the terminology defined above, only that fit supports a
claim that basic constitutional rules are legitimate.20 6 The constitutional
change in Canada in 1980-82 mirrored the full range of disagreements
and contradictions of Canada because it came out of a process which was
molded by those contradictions and disagreements. 0 7
b. The Dissent of Quebec
One critical feature thus far omitted is the failure to secure the
agreement of the .government of Quebec. This opposition provides the ba-
sis for an assertion that the new Constitution is* illegitimate. The political
entity, Canada, has always been associated with both the amalgamation
and the continued separate identities of its two principal language
groups-English and French. The recognition of the need for French ac-
quiescence in the shared institutions of government has historic roots, go-
visions of the country. It only entrenches them in the Constitution and provides
new arenas in which the battles of the future will be fought.
Cairns, supra note 20, at 23. See id. at 27-28.
205 E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 37-38 (1797, Bobbs, Merrill
ed., Mahoney ed. 1955).
206 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
107 See Banting & Simeon, supra note 199, at 25. The Constitution, as Professor Cairns
noted, does not resolve, it "entrenches" those contradictions. See the quotation in supra
note 204. Professor Cairns has analyzed the constituent process in two illuminating essays.
See Cairns, supra note 20; Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making, supra note 151. His
conclusions are less optimistic than those in the text. At one point he states: "To look back
on the constitutional reform process is to be made depressingly aware of the intimate corre-
lation between the substance of the various constitutional packages and the interests pre-
sent or absent at their creation." Cairns, The Politics of Constitution-Making, supra note
151. That there was such a correlation there can be no doubt. Whether or not awareness of
it is depressing is less clear. Professor Cairns has expressed concern that the process in-
volved exclusively the leaders of governments and that their disagreements "did not reflect
socio-economic or other divisions in society which were then manifested in elite intransi-
gence, but political divisions between members of federal and political elites themselves."
Id. See Leach, Implications for Federalism of the Reformed Constitution of Canada, 45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (1982). Ordinarily, however, we do expect our social and
economic interests to be, at least, roughly mirrored in our representative institutions. It is
true that unlike the 1787-89 events in the United States, the 1980-82 process was carried on
through pre-existing political channels. It is not certain, however, that the same kind of
extraordinary action would have been deemed more legitimate in Canada, in light of the
historical traditions of Canadian government. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying
text. In any event, as Professor Cairns has noted, see supra note 20, at 21-22, 37-38, the
introduction of the threat of unilateral action by the federal government did stimulate the
kind of exceptional national debate described in the text. That experience is not easily de-
scribed as another rendition of the same old political game. See Banting & Simeon, supra
note 199, at 2-8.
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ing back to the Quebec Act of 1774.2"8 That recognition was surely an
important influence in the original confederation of 1867. The constitu-
tion of the preceding colonial legislature of the United Province of Ca-
nada, comprising what is now Ontario and Quebec, required equal repre-
sentation for Upper (Ontario) and Lower (Quebec) Canada. The
population-based apportionment of the new central parliament was ac-
ceptable to the French only because the new provincial government of
Quebec would be largely autonomous in matters of religion, education,
civil law and domestic institutions-subjects of particular concern to the
French-speaking inhabitants. 09 The presence of an irreducible French
fact in Canadian politics has never since been absent. If anything, in re-
cent decades it has become more pronounced. Its clearest expression was
in the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,
issued in the late 1960's, which effectively endorsed the concept of "two
nations" coexisting within the Canadian polity.210 The federal govern-
ment appeared to embrace this notion by following through with legisla-
tion aimed at a thorough-going bilingualism in all federal institutions.211
Although the idea that Canada is the result of a compact among the
provinces has been controversial, 2 2 the suggestion that a continuing ac-
cord exists among the two language groups has been much more hospita-
bly received.2 13 This history makes plausible the contention that any con-
stitutional arrangements imposed in the teeth of widespread French
opposition would be inconsonant with generally accepted aspects of the
Canadian state and thus, illegitimate.
After the agreement of November 1981, an analogous question was
put before the Supreme Court of Canada in the constitutional reference
brought by the Province of Quebec. The province argued that the action
208 See K. McNAUGHT, supra note 154, at 50.
209 See id. at 122-23; D. CREIGHTON, THE ROAD TO CONFEDERATION, 145 (1964); P. HOGG,
supra note 33, at 33; W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 48, 58-59.
210 See K. MCNAUGHT, supra note 155, at 309.
211 McConnell, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Amending Process in Canada, 44 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROS. 195, 199 (1981).
212 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
213 Corry states:
However, if we speak in moral rather than in strict legal terms, there is ground for
saying the confederation was a compact, not between the several provinces but
between the two races English and French, which agreed to associate together in
the Dominion of Canada on terms of mutual tolerance and respect. The most im-
portant reason for a federal union rather than a unitary one was that a unitary
state was entirely unacceptable to French-speaking Canadians. They were willing
to come in only on condition that matters affecting language, religion and basic
social relationships were exclusively reserved to the provinces. It might not be a
breach of contract but it would be a breach of faith now to insist on withdrawing
such matters from jurisdiction of the provinces without their consent.
J. CORRY, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 375-76 (1946), quoted in P. GERIN-LAJoIE,
supra note 156, at 214. See also id. at 177; K. McNAUGHT, supra note 155, at 131-32; Mal-
lory, The Politics of Constitutional Change, 45 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 53, 65-66 (1982).
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of the federal Parliament, based on that agreement, was in violation of a
constitutional convention because it was opposed by the government of
Quebec. That contention was rejected in a unanimous opinion. 214 The
Court's conclusion was based on its finding that the province had not
shown that the claimed convention met all three strictly defined criteria.
That is, the Court answered the narrow question, "Is there a conven-
tion?" and not the broader one, "Is this process legitimate?"2 1 5
Any argument that a process which omits the participation and
agreement of representatives of French-speaking Canadians could be a
legitimate basis for the Constitution of Canada is extremely weak. The
actual question is much more complicated. French Canadians, for the
purpose of this inquiry, may not be synonomous with Quebec. 216 This
seems particularly clear in light of the fact that the dissenting Quebec
government was elected in a campaign from which it had expressly ex-
cluded its own constitutional argument for Quebec sovereignty. In fact,
French Canadians participated vigorously in the constitutional debate.
The federal parliamentary majority, which passed the federal initiative
over Quebec's opposition, was composed substantially of French-speaking
members from Quebec under the leadership of a French-Canadian Prime
Minister.21 7 All of this undercut the claim that the new Constitution was
214 Attorney-General of Quebec v. Attorney-General of Canada, 140 D.L.R.3d 385 (Can.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Quebec Reference].
2l Id. at 393-404. It is worth remarking how, in only its second expedition into the
problematic world of adjudicating the existence of constitutional conventions, the Court
adopted with little discussion, a rigid, almost canonical, view of the criteria to be met by a
would-be convention, based on the definition offered by Sir W. Ivor Jennings in his LAW AND
THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1959), quoted in Quebec Reference, 140 D.L.R.3d at 393. So
completely were these standards accepted, that the question of whether Quebec consent met
one of them (whether the actors in prior precedents believed they were bound by the rule)
was addressed by a close analysis of Jennings' text, scrutinizing and parsing it as if it were a
statute. Id. at 403-04. The need that the Court clearly felt to assimilate this concededly
unenforceable obligation to ordinary rules of law raises again questions about the fitness of
judicial resolution of such matters. See Kay, supra note 34, at 28-29; Hogg, Casenote, 60
CAN. B. REV. 307, 320-24 (1982).
214 Certainly the policy of the federal government under Prime Minister Trudeau has
been to make Canada a country, in all parts of which, French speakers could be comfortable,
and to undermine the idea that French Canada was found in Quebec alone. See Banting &
Simeon, supra note 199, at 12; Cairns, supra note 20, at 31-34. Still, the claim that the
province of Quebec is the best institutional representative of French Canadians in the con-
federation is a strong one. Counsel for Quebec in the Quebec Reference quoted the Task
Force of Canadian Unity which described Quebec as "the stronghold of the French-Cana-
dian people" and "the living heart of the French presence in North America." Factum of the
Attorney-General of Quebec, translation quoted in Quebec Reference, 140 D.L.R.3d at 401.
On the possible consequences for Canadian unity of the exclusion of Quebec from the con-
stitutional agreement, see Bergeron, Quebec in Isolation, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDER-
ALIsM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT 59 (K. Banting & R. Simeon ed. 1983).
217 In the 32nd Parliament, which passed the Constitutional resolutions, the Liberals
controlled 146 seats out of 281 in the House of Commons. There were 75 members from
Quebec who were overwhelmingly Liberals. Prime Minister Trudeau represents the riding of
19841
156 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
the product of a process which was illegitimate by virtue of the failure to
secure the agreement of the government of Quebec.
Indeed, the uncertainty as to constitutional legitimacy resulting from
doubts about French acceptance is exemplary of a more general problem.
The acquiescence of French Canadians is not something which can be
known immediately and there is no formula for ascertaining it. It can
only be estimated as events and attitudes unfold over time.s18 But this is
equally true of other segments and actors in Canadian society. Arguments
about legitimacy cannot be based solely on the presence or absence of
certain elements at a particular moment in time. That aspect of conten-
tions concerning legitimacy will be next considered.
VI. THE TEMPORAL NATURE OF LEGITIMACY
Those persons, if any who did give their consent formally, are all now
dead .... And the Constitution, so far as it was their contract, died
with them. They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory
upon their children.
Lysander Spooner, 1870219
The discussion up to this point may have been misleading in empha-
sizing facts, events and attitudes existing at discrete periods in the past.
This may have suggested that an assertion of legitimacy is premised
solely on a critical examination of this kind of material, evaluated accord-
ing to abstract and ahistorical standards, and that the legitimacy of the
constituent process thus would be determined once and for all. But ques-
tions about constitutional legitimacy, in the sense used here, cannot be so
narrowly confined in time. Assertions about the legitimacy of the rules
which control a legal system will turn on the acceptability of the sub-
stance and origins of those rules to participants in the legal system. Fur-
thermore, that acceptability is always a current acceptability. The legiti-
macy of the Constitution of the United States in 1984 cannot be debated
on the limited basis of the events and circumstances of 1787-89 without
Mount Royal in Montreal. CANADIAN ALMANAc AND DIRECTORY 512 (1983).
218 If there exist two sets of political values in the French and English communities so
basically at odds that no set of constitutional arrangements is likely to secure the adherence
of the relevant actors in both communities, a plausible argument is possible that no precon-
stitutional rule is legitimate for that polity historically known as Canada which definition-
ally includes significant French and English populations. See C. FREDRICH, supra note 34,
at 237, 239; Stillman, supra note 34, at 43 ("Indeed, since legitimacy is related to the value
patterns of a society, it is possible to imagine a society in which legitimacy could not exist
because the society's value pattern is bifurcated, too chaotic, or too contradictory, or espe-
cially because different portions of society strongly hold different value patterns with differ-
ent key values, as in the United States in 1860-61, Pakistan in 1971-72, and Northern Ire-
land still").




considering attitudes and values in the United States in 1984. A Constitu-
tion which we can be reasonably sure was immune to a claim of illegiti-
macy in the tenth year of its existence may, because of changed percep-
tions, be cogently attacked as illegitimate in its hundredth year.
None of this is to say that the circumstances surrounding the pro-
mulgation of constitutional rules are irrelevant to disputes about legiti-
macy. Those circumstances will probably be an important factor in shap-
ing the perceptions which are critical to claims of legitimacy in future
periods. The participants in a legal system will constantly judge the ac-
ceptability of its fundamental rule, partly, on the basis of their under-
standing of the propriety of the process that brought it about. Thus a
basic rule, understood to originate in divine revelation, may continue to
be regarded as legitimate only so long as the appropriate members of so-
ciety continue to believe that they are obliged to conform to divine com-
mands. When that underlying belief dissolves, the preconstitutional rule
legitimated by it will be more vulnerable to criticism. Then, either some
other justification for accepting the rule will develop or the rule will no
longer govern the legal system.220 This appears to be what happened in
Canada as it evolved to independence. The prior legitimating event, the
enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament of the British North
America Acts, ceased to be adequate in light of new political realities.
What will be seen as legitimate origins for constitutional rules, and for
how long, are questions that depend upon the social, intellectual and po-
litical changes in a society. A new regime may arise through royal decree,
through charismatic leadership, through violent revolution, through spon-
taneous democratic assemblies or through quiet political agreements. The
extent to which the products of any of these processes will arouse com-
plaints of illegitimacy will certainly change with the times.
In making an estimate of the likelihood that such criticism will
emerge, it is necessary to consider several factors. First, will be the
probability that the procedure which gave birth to the constitutional re-
gime will be regarded (or remembered) as appropriate. Beyond that, how-
ever, it will be necessary that the content of the rules created maintain a
minimum fit with the social requirements of the society whose law it gov-
erns. 221 At some point even a rule promulgated in a manner still deemed
unexceptionable will fall to satisfy the practical demands made upon the
legal system and be open to doubts as to its legitimacy in the context of
220 This is another way of saying that a new legal system has been established. The
"old" preconstitutional rule is, then, no more than a historical artifact. See H. HART, supra
note 24, at 117. In the terminology used in the text, a constitutional rule based on it would
be subject to charge of illegitimacy, although its formal legality remained unimpaired. See
supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the colonial authority of the
United Kingdom over Canada. See also Finnis, supra note 19, at 67-68; Remillard, supra
note 34, at 194; cf. Russell, supra note 147, at 218.
M See Postera, supra note 32, at 178.
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new social and political facts.222
Moreover, the apparent legitimacy of a given constitutional regime
will, in some measure, be generated by its own momentum. That is, a
given fundamental constitutional rule will be accepted simply by virtue of
its acknowledged status over time. In such cases, the events which gener-
ated it may acquire respectability from the Constitution instead of the
other way around.223 So long as constitutional arrangements perform their
function fairly well, roughly coincide with the values and needs of the
society and are not perceived as originating from an affirmatively per-
verse source, their legitimacy is unlikely to arise as a serious question.
2 4
The costs of a major and overt re-examination and redefinition of the
underlying political premises of a legal system are so substantial that
such a process will not be undertaken frequently.225 The authors of the
Declaration of Independence were undoubtedly right in claiming that "all
Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while
Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to
which they are accustomed.
' '226
The process by which a Constitution of questionable legitimacy and
certain illegality may, nevertheless, come to be firmly established as legit-
imate is illustrated by the swift transformation of the Constitution of the
United States into a virtually universally revered source of authority. Al-
though the Constitution concededly was illegal in its inception and ratifi-
222 This will more certainly be the case if the preconstitutional rule provides static,
inflexible criteria of validity as would be the case when it specifies conformity to an
unamendable written constitution. Whether a radically amended constitution could be de-
fended as legitimate under the same standard of legitimacy as earlier versions is a difficult
question, particularly when the earlier amending formula is, itself altered. See Ross, supra
note 43.
223 Olivecrona suggests that the Roman legal system was founded originally on a pre-
sumed religious obligation:
Over a period of several hundred years great changes in the psychological bases of
the constitution necessarily took place. When government has been carried on for
a long time according to a set of rules, such rules are supported by habits of
thought and many other factors. The old creed may be undermined and the ritual
acts reduced to mere formalities; but for numerous reasons respect for rules may
never-the-less be upheld and the forms reverently observed.
K. OLIVECRONA, supra note 24, at 103; cf. W. LEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 32-33; Hyde,
supra note 34, at 411.
224 See Postema, supra note 32, at 178-89.
225 The existing Constitution acquires a presumption in its favor merely by being the
status quo. Thus, Dicey believed that it was only changes in the Constitution which ought
to be referred to the extraordinary judgment of the people. See supra note 150. In a more
practical sense the persistence of a Constitution over time is sure to result in the entrench-
ment of interests that will present obstacles to any serious reconsideration. This tendency,
of course, is accentuated when the same political interests are the most likely initiators of
constitutional change. See Cairns, supra note 20, at 40-43.
22 Declaration of Independence, para. 2. (U.S. 1776). The factors referred to in the
text, therefore, involve a rough combination of what Weber described as the "legal" and
"traditional" bases of legitimacy. See M. WEBER, supra note 35, at 324-29, 382-86.
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cation, its authority was justified on the basis of the political sanction
provided by the approval of "the people. 2 27 But a contemporary observer
surely would have been skeptical about the prospects for general accept-
ance. The intensity of passion aroused by the debate over both the legiti-
macy of the constituent process and the character of the new constitu-
tional rules is hard to overestimate. Governor Clinton of New York was
not particularly extreme in his criticism when he charged that the Consti-
tution "was founded in usurpation. 2 2' The claim was not infrequently
made that the Constitution was the result of a conspiracy by the wealthy
to betray the Revolution and impose an aristocratic government.2 29 "If we
are to listen to the participants," one commentator has written, "the
struggle over the Constitution was a dispute between contending social
interests over a question no less vital than the future of republican gov-
ernment in America and the world." 30 Given this level of argument, given
the questionable tactics often used in the ratifying conventions,23 1 and
given the closeness of the result in some of the critical states, 232 it is
something of a wonder that within a very few years the Constitution was
embraced, not grudgingly, but often with near veneration by the very
people who had so violently denounced it.23 3 The issue of legitimacy rap-
idly disappeared.
A number of reasons explain the quick acceptance of the Constitu-
217 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
' Quoted in M. JENSEN, supra note 51, at 145.
2' See L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EvOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY
115 (1978). The complete writings of the anti-Federalists have recently been compiled in
seven volumes. THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981). A useful collection of
such writings is THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, supra note 70. One writer has commented that "the
ratification controversy was a struggle between contending social interests calling forth an
intensity of rhetoric seldom equalled in American disputes." L. BANNING, supra, at 105.
23 See Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution 1789-93,
31 WM. & MARY Q. 167 (1974).
331 See generally J. MAIN, supra note 122, at 187-248.
M3 See id. at 249; C. BEARD, supra note 60, at 237-38.
233 Banning states:
The quick apotheosis of the American Constitution was a phenomenon without
parallel in the Western world. Nowhere has fundamental constitutional change
been accepted with so much ease. Nowhere have so many fierce opponents of a
constitutional revision been so quickly transformed into an opposition that
claimed to be more loyal than the government itself.
Banning, supra note 230, at 167.
See Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution, in THm
RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1789, at 379-95 (J. Greene ed.
1968). The collapse of the anti-Federalist position is illustrated by the case of Luther Mar-
tin of Maryland, a member of the Constitutional Convention who denounced the new Con-
stitution savagely in the subsequent ratification debate, see supra note 118, and who,
shortly afterwards, became known as the Federalist "bull-dog." See Roche, The Founding
Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, in THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN REvoLU-
TION, 1763-1789, at 436, 466 (J. Greene ed. 1968); Schechter, The Early History of the Tra-
dition of the Constitution, 9 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 707 (1915).
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tion. For all its defects the ratification process stimulated as extensive
and thorough a national debate as could exist in that period and in those
circumstances. And the approval of the state conventions was also-again
in the context of those times-about as democratic a procedure as could
be devised. Thus, the practically universal recognition of the ultimate
sovereignty of the people provided a powerful reason for accepting the
people's verdict and getting on with other national business.23' Further-
more, the actual governmental arrangements which the new Constitution
established were not so radical as to place them outside of generally ac-
cepted notions of republican government. 23 5 The consequence of both of
these factors was that, despite the Anti-Federalists' protestations to the
contrary and the vehemence of their arguments, the differences, both as
to the manner in which the new Constitution was created and the main
features of the system which it instituted, were not differences of deep
principle. 2 1
Once the constitutional government was in place, its advantages and
disadvantages, relative to reasonably possible alternatives, must have
been seen rather differently. One historian has argued that the classical
political orientation of the Anti-Federalist statesmen resulted in a convic-
tion that constitutional changes were always for the worse and that the
protection of liberty now depended on a scrupulous adherence to the
newly established constitutional rules.23 7 Whatever the precise reasons,
perceptions changed once the Constitution achieved the privileged posi-
tion of status quo. Now the burden of proof on the question of legitimacy
would rest on those who would challenge the existing constitutional rules.
In that sense, the Constitution became more secure with every year.
It is true, of course, that the Constitution was to suffer more than
one challenging jolt in the subsequent course of American history. Most
234 Ely states:
The Declaration of Independence had not been ratified at all, and the Articles of
Confederation had been ratified by the various state legislatures. The Constitu-
tion, however, was submitted for ratification to "the people themselves" actually
to "popular ratifying conventions" elected in each state. A few spoilsports pointed
out that this was not significantly more "democratic" than submitting the docu-
ments to the legislatures (since the conventions themselves would necessarily be
representative bodies and much the same cast would likely be chosen as the peo-
ple's representatives). But the symbolism was important nonetheless .... It is
also instructive that once the Constitution was ratified, virtually everyone in
America accepted it immediately as the document controlling its destiny. Why
should that be? Those who had opposed ratification certainly hadn't agreed to
such an arrangement. It's quite remarkable if you think about it and the explana-
tion has to be that they accepted the legitimacy of the majority's verdict.
J. ELY, supra note 121, at 5-6; see L. BANNINa supra note 229, at 106; M. DIAMOND, supra
note 75, at 54; Banning, supra note 230, at 169.
235 See Banning, supra note 230, at 169.
226 See L. BANNING, supra note 229, at 106; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 233, at 395.
2s7 See Banning, supra note 230, at 177-87.
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obvious is the political and human cataclysm of the Civil War from which
the Constitution emerged significantly changed. Even in the critical de-
bates leading up to the war, proponents of each position often grounded
their arguments in an interpretation of the Constitution.238 Even seces-
sion, itself, was sometimes justified as consistent with the constitutional
scheme of 1787.239 That question of constitutional construction having
been settled by the war, the legitimacy of the Constitution was en-
hanced.240 Reverence for the constituent process was, and continues to be,
a significant part of the regard which the Constitution enjoys. Serious,
and occasionally violent, constitutional differences have occurred but
these are matters arising within a common allegiance to what is almost
universally regarded as the binding law of the Constitution. Its authority
has been treated as Jefferson found it treated in France in the debates of
the National Assembly, "like that of the Bible, open to explanation, but
not to question. '24 1 "The divine right of kings never ran a more prosper-
ous course than did the unquestioned prerogative of the Constitution to
receive universal homage.
24 2
's$ See H. HYmAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT 1835-1875, at 115-231 (1982). This is not to say that certain participants did not,
sometimes, reject wholesale the authority of the Constitution. While some abolitionists at-
tempted a constitutionil argument against slavery, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 154-58
(1975), others denounced the Constitution and its rather explicit protection of slavery. See
id. at 150-54. Among the most prominent of these was William Lloyd Garrison. His view is
illustrated by a speech he gave on July 4, 1854, in Framingham, Massachusetts, described by
Phillip S. Paludan:
Then he reached for a copy of the Constitution, held it in his hand and declared
that it was the "parent of all the other atrocities." "A covenant with death," he
called it, "An agreement with hell." He set it afire and cried out as it burned, "So
perish all compromises with tyranny! 'And let the people say Amen."' A huge
shout of "Amen" echoed. But this time hisses and angry outcries were also
audible.
P. PALAUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 3 (1975).
2" See H. HYmwN & W. WIECEK, supra note 238, at 208-15. In his inaugural address to
the Confederate Provisional Congress in Feb. 1861, Jefferson Davis cited the Declaration of
Independence but also insisted that the secession and formation of a new southern govern-
ment had "not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to
perform every constitutional duty." It was only "by abuse of language that their act has
been denominated a revolution." JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY AND TREATIES
CONCLUDED BY THE CONFEDERATE STATES wITH INDIAN TmBEs 10 (R. Gibson ed. 1977). An
explicit post-war refutation of this position is Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
2, See Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1303-05 (1937).
2" Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 96, 99 (H. Washington ed. 1861); see Monaghan, Our Perfect Consti-
tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 353, 356-57 (1981), and sources cited in id. at 356 nn.23-24.
24 Corwin, The Worship of the Constitution, in 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 47
(Loss ed. 1981) (quoting Woodrow Wilson). See Cahow, Comparative Insights into Consti-
tutional History: Canada, The Critical Years, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40-42 (1982);
Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 225 (1937);
Monaghan, supra note 241. Of course, the occasional, idiosyncratic attack on the legitimacy
of the Constitution is not unknown in American history. See supra note 238; L. SPOONER,
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This is not to say that a similar process is confidently to be expected
in Canada. Whether or not the new Constitution will suffer continuing
doubts on the score of legitimacy depends on a continued widely-held un-
derstanding of the propriety of the constituent process and the suitability
of the new ultimate legal authority it created. In judging both these fac-
tors, the acquiescence or disaffection of French Canadians is likely to be
crucial, and the bitter rejection of both the manner and content of the
agreement of November 1981 by the government of Quebec will be a fac-
tor in determining the likelihood that a substantial challenge can be
raised.24 3
But it is too early to be pessimistic about the legitimacy of the Cana-
dian Constitution. The course of events resulting in the creation and
maintenance of the Constitution of the United States make this clear. 4
The discussion of the events of 1980-82 reveal reasons to hope that the
new Canadian Constitution will acquire and maintain general acceptance.
The procedures which led up to the Constitution, while without exact
precedent, can be defended as both fair and representative of all impor-
tant Canadian interests. That process, moreover, filtered out most fea-
tures which would have provoked extreme opposition from any significant
segment of Canadian society. It established constitutional rules which
embody no drastic departure from the inarticulate understanding of con-
stitutional authority which had been assumed for some time.245 It thus
has many of the advantages which contributed to the success of the
American "coup d'6tat" of 1787-89.
Since arguments about legitimacy depend upon current attitudes and
actions, the historical origins of a constitutional regime cannot exhaust
the topics which figure in such arguments. They comprise only one ele-
ment influencing those attitudes and actions. Indeed, every legal system
is, in this sense, always being chosen, and is always at the risk of being
rejected.2 46 Often when basic constitutional rules are rejected and new
ones established, the change is masked by the existing legal forms and
formulas which remain unchanged.247 In Canada in 1980-82 and in the
supra note 219.
243 Quebec's Premier Rene Levesque declared after the November agreement that
"[t]here is no possibility for a self-respecting Quebec government to accept such a develop-
ment." Toronto Globe & Mail, Nov. 6, 1981, at 12. Moreover, he referred to the process of
negotiation and agreement as "farce and trickery." Id., Nov. 10, 1981, at 1; see McConnell,
supra note 8, at 216, 229.
244 See supra notes 47-127. Professor Knopff and Mr. Strayer have already noted the
parallels between the United States constituent process of 1787-89 and that in Canada in
1980-82, in terms of the distinction between strict legality and ultimate political acceptance.
See Knopff, supra note 8, at 61-62, 64-65; Strayer, supra note 34, at 3-4.
245 Cairns, supra note 20, at 39.
246 See Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8
U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 462-63 (1982).
247 It is hard to contest the claim that the governing rules of the legal system of the
United States have changed significantly from the ideas of the framers and ratifiers of the
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United States in 1787-89 a rare confluence of historical and political fac-
tors forced the process into the open and the debates on legitimacy be-
came more explicit.2 4 8 The extraordinary national confrontations with
fundamental constitutional needs and preferences followed.
This kind of unusual occurrence does not make the Constitution
which results any less provisional. An inchoate challenge to constitutional
arrangements based on a claim of illegitimacy is always lurking at the
edges of any legal system. Whether concerns as to constitutional legiti-
macy will now dissolve or persist will depend on the character of the Ca-
nadian polity. The factors which will influence that result cannot be enu-
merated with any certainty. It was understood that the new Constitution
Act would be just the first stage of substantive constitutional reform.' 9
The suitability of the amending power will be judged largely on its per-
formance in carrying out that reform. The actions of the institutions of
government, particularly the courts, implementing the constitutional
scheme are likely to be critical. Perhaps most important will be whether
or not the new constitutional arrangement will be given time to settle into
the ordinary expectations of participants in the Canadian legal system
and begin to influence, as well as be influenced by, the underlying politi-
cal and social realities in Canada.
The formal change has been accomplished. However, that legal trans-
formation is only the outer manifestation of less obvious social and politi-
cal factors. Whether the formal change will so mirror a stable consensus
in society as to make questions of legitimacy irrelevant cannot now be
known.150 The real priorities were expressed astutely in an editorial car-.
toon published in the same newspaper issue as that in which the plans for
the proclamation of the Constitution Act, 1982 were described. An appar-
ently exhausted Canada, in the form of a beaver, reclines on a doctor's
examining table. The physician leans over to give his somewhat equivocal
conclusion: "Now that you have a Constitution," he tells his patient, "all
you need is a heart."2 '
Constitution, if in no other respect than in the recognition of the validity of constitutional
rules promulgated by the United States Supreme Court that are not derived from the text
of the Constitution. There seems no other conclusion but that the underlying preconstitu-
tional rule has shifted to accomodate this. See Kay, supra note 28.
2 See Colvin, supra note 34, at 12.
24) Section 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982 required a constitutional conference of first
ministers on the rights of aboriginal peoples. That conference was held on Mar. 15-16, 1983.
An accord issuing from the conference proposed an amendment concerning native land
claims and called for two more conferences in the following five years. Some commentators
have expressed skepticism as to the likelihood of significant constitutional change in the
near future. See Banting & Simeon, Federalism, Democracy and the Future, in AND No
ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION AcT 348 (K. Banting & R.
Simeon eds. 1983).
210 See Cahow, supra note 242, at 52.
261 Toronto Globe & Mail, Mar. 27, 1982, at 6, col. 12.
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